This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Kant e-prints (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/659 |
Resumo: | According to Robert Hanna, natural kind concepts concepts have an indexical component, represented by 'THIS BODY', that refers to the totality of matter found in any given possible world, and an attributive component, made up of phenomenological identifying features. I will argue that there is no place for indexicals in Hanna’s theory. Initially, demonstratives don't select worlds, as his theory requires. Moreover, even as we try to amend his theory, either giving a proper reference to demonstratives or postulating the indexical reference to worlds by other linguistic mechanisms, we still can’t find a place for indexicals. The reason is that the satisfactional semantics of general terms, needed to vindicate his approach of modalities as evaluated at a rationally shaped modal space, requires no indexical component. |
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This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind conceptsmodalityindexicaltwo-dimensional semanticsnatural kind conceptsAccording to Robert Hanna, natural kind concepts concepts have an indexical component, represented by 'THIS BODY', that refers to the totality of matter found in any given possible world, and an attributive component, made up of phenomenological identifying features. I will argue that there is no place for indexicals in Hanna’s theory. Initially, demonstratives don't select worlds, as his theory requires. Moreover, even as we try to amend his theory, either giving a proper reference to demonstratives or postulating the indexical reference to worlds by other linguistic mechanisms, we still can’t find a place for indexicals. The reason is that the satisfactional semantics of general terms, needed to vindicate his approach of modalities as evaluated at a rationally shaped modal space, requires no indexical component.Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE)2017-03-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/659Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 46-57Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 46-571677-163Xreponame:Kant e-prints (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:Unicampporhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/659/536Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Printsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPerini-Santos, Ernesto2021-10-17T20:55:25Zoai:www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/:article/659Revistahttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/PUBhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/oaiclekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br1677-163X1677-163Xopendoar:2021-10-17T20:55:25Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts |
title |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts |
spellingShingle |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts Perini-Santos, Ernesto modality indexical two-dimensional semantics natural kind concepts |
title_short |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts |
title_full |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts |
title_fullStr |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts |
title_full_unstemmed |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts |
title_sort |
This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts |
author |
Perini-Santos, Ernesto |
author_facet |
Perini-Santos, Ernesto |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Perini-Santos, Ernesto |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
modality indexical two-dimensional semantics natural kind concepts |
topic |
modality indexical two-dimensional semantics natural kind concepts |
description |
According to Robert Hanna, natural kind concepts concepts have an indexical component, represented by 'THIS BODY', that refers to the totality of matter found in any given possible world, and an attributive component, made up of phenomenological identifying features. I will argue that there is no place for indexicals in Hanna’s theory. Initially, demonstratives don't select worlds, as his theory requires. Moreover, even as we try to amend his theory, either giving a proper reference to demonstratives or postulating the indexical reference to worlds by other linguistic mechanisms, we still can’t find a place for indexicals. The reason is that the satisfactional semantics of general terms, needed to vindicate his approach of modalities as evaluated at a rationally shaped modal space, requires no indexical component. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-03-10 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/659 |
url |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/659 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/659/536 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 46-57 Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 46-57 1677-163X reponame:Kant e-prints (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:Unicamp |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
Unicamp |
institution |
Unicamp |
reponame_str |
Kant e-prints (Online) |
collection |
Kant e-prints (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
clekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br |
_version_ |
1754842243338862592 |