The "principle" in dubio pro societate and its application in jury

• Autor(a) principal: Lukachewski Junior, Wanderlei
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Outros Autores: Benedetti, Ívina
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Revista Diálogo
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.unilasalle.edu.br/index.php/Dialogo/article/view/2238-9024.15.16
• topic: The jury; In Dubio pro Societate; Unconstitutional.; Direito;Direito Penal; Tribunal do Júri; In Dubio pro Societate; Inconstitucional.

This paper has as its focus to demonstrate the existence of two identical moments within the jury: receipt of the complaint and the decision to pronunciation. In this step, although it is not necessary to justify the reason for termination of receipt of the decision of the presumption enshrined judged that the facts described in the part of the accusatory body were duly checked and faced with the constant evidence of the police investigation or other documents accompanying the home, the judgment made by the magistrate within the pronunciation is exactly the same decision already made upon receipt of the complaint, to indicate the existence of evidence of materiality and authorship of the crime. Worse, the decision leading the accused to jury trial is supported in principle non-existent within our legal system "in dubio pro societate", meaning that there is doubt about the existence of materiality and authorship of the crime the accused should be judged by their peers through the Council of Judgment. Thus, this article seeks to demonstrate that this "principle" has no legal support as it hurts constitutional principles guaranteed to the accused,and therefore unconstitutional.