The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Haselager, Willem
Data de Publicação: 2006
Outros Autores: Gonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP]
Tipo de documento: Capítulo de livro
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UNESP
Texto Completo: http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/220135
Resumo: The question as to how sign processes can be meaningful to artificial agents has been a fundamental one for cognitive science throughout its history, from Turing's (1950) argument from consciousness, to Searle's (1980) Chinese room and Harnad's (1990) symbol grounding problem. Currently, the question is even more pressing in the light of recent developments in AI robotics, specifically in the area of reactive and evolutionary approaches. One would perhaps expect that given the embodied and embedded nature of these systems, meaningful sign processes would emerge from the interactions between these robots and their environment. So far, however, robots seem to lack any sensitivity to the significance of signs. In this chapter we will suggest that the artificiality of the body of current robots precludes the emergence of meaning. In fact, one may question whether the label embodied genuinely applies to current robots. It may be more truthful to speak of robots being physicalized, given that the types of matter used in creating robots bears more similarity to machines like cars or airplanes than to organisms. Thus, we are driven to an investigation of how body and meaning relate. We suggest that meaning is closely related to the strengths and weaknesses of organic bodies of cognitive systems in relation to their struggle for survival. Specifically, as long as four essential characteristics of organic bodies (autopoiesis, metabolism, centrifugal development and self-organization) are lacking in artificial systems, there will be little possibility of the emergence of meaningful sign processes. © 2007, Idea Group Inc.
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spelling The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creaturesThe question as to how sign processes can be meaningful to artificial agents has been a fundamental one for cognitive science throughout its history, from Turing's (1950) argument from consciousness, to Searle's (1980) Chinese room and Harnad's (1990) symbol grounding problem. Currently, the question is even more pressing in the light of recent developments in AI robotics, specifically in the area of reactive and evolutionary approaches. One would perhaps expect that given the embodied and embedded nature of these systems, meaningful sign processes would emerge from the interactions between these robots and their environment. So far, however, robots seem to lack any sensitivity to the significance of signs. In this chapter we will suggest that the artificiality of the body of current robots precludes the emergence of meaning. In fact, one may question whether the label embodied genuinely applies to current robots. It may be more truthful to speak of robots being physicalized, given that the types of matter used in creating robots bears more similarity to machines like cars or airplanes than to organisms. Thus, we are driven to an investigation of how body and meaning relate. We suggest that meaning is closely related to the strengths and weaknesses of organic bodies of cognitive systems in relation to their struggle for survival. Specifically, as long as four essential characteristics of organic bodies (autopoiesis, metabolism, centrifugal development and self-organization) are lacking in artificial systems, there will be little possibility of the emergence of meaningful sign processes. © 2007, Idea Group Inc.Department of Artificial Intelligence / Cognitive Science (NICI) Raboud University, NijmegenUNESPUNESPRaboud UniversityUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)Haselager, WillemGonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP]2022-04-28T18:59:49Z2022-04-28T18:59:49Z2006-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart238-250http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008Artificial Cognition Systems, p. 238-250.http://hdl.handle.net/11449/22013510.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch0082-s2.0-84899184274Scopusreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengArtificial Cognition Systemsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-04-28T18:59:49Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/220135Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462024-08-05T18:39:10.621090Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
title The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
spellingShingle The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
Haselager, Willem
title_short The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
title_full The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
title_fullStr The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
title_full_unstemmed The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
title_sort The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
author Haselager, Willem
author_facet Haselager, Willem
Gonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP]
author_role author
author2 Gonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP]
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Raboud University
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Haselager, Willem
Gonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP]
description The question as to how sign processes can be meaningful to artificial agents has been a fundamental one for cognitive science throughout its history, from Turing's (1950) argument from consciousness, to Searle's (1980) Chinese room and Harnad's (1990) symbol grounding problem. Currently, the question is even more pressing in the light of recent developments in AI robotics, specifically in the area of reactive and evolutionary approaches. One would perhaps expect that given the embodied and embedded nature of these systems, meaningful sign processes would emerge from the interactions between these robots and their environment. So far, however, robots seem to lack any sensitivity to the significance of signs. In this chapter we will suggest that the artificiality of the body of current robots precludes the emergence of meaning. In fact, one may question whether the label embodied genuinely applies to current robots. It may be more truthful to speak of robots being physicalized, given that the types of matter used in creating robots bears more similarity to machines like cars or airplanes than to organisms. Thus, we are driven to an investigation of how body and meaning relate. We suggest that meaning is closely related to the strengths and weaknesses of organic bodies of cognitive systems in relation to their struggle for survival. Specifically, as long as four essential characteristics of organic bodies (autopoiesis, metabolism, centrifugal development and self-organization) are lacking in artificial systems, there will be little possibility of the emergence of meaningful sign processes. © 2007, Idea Group Inc.
publishDate 2006
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2006-12-01
2022-04-28T18:59:49Z
2022-04-28T18:59:49Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008
Artificial Cognition Systems, p. 238-250.
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/220135
10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008
2-s2.0-84899184274
url http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/220135
identifier_str_mv Artificial Cognition Systems, p. 238-250.
10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008
2-s2.0-84899184274
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Artificial Cognition Systems
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 238-250
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Scopus
reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP
instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron:UNESP
instname_str Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
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reponame_str Repositório Institucional da UNESP
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
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