The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
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Tipo de documento: | Capítulo de livro |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
Texto Completo: | http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/220135 |
Resumo: | The question as to how sign processes can be meaningful to artificial agents has been a fundamental one for cognitive science throughout its history, from Turing's (1950) argument from consciousness, to Searle's (1980) Chinese room and Harnad's (1990) symbol grounding problem. Currently, the question is even more pressing in the light of recent developments in AI robotics, specifically in the area of reactive and evolutionary approaches. One would perhaps expect that given the embodied and embedded nature of these systems, meaningful sign processes would emerge from the interactions between these robots and their environment. So far, however, robots seem to lack any sensitivity to the significance of signs. In this chapter we will suggest that the artificiality of the body of current robots precludes the emergence of meaning. In fact, one may question whether the label embodied genuinely applies to current robots. It may be more truthful to speak of robots being physicalized, given that the types of matter used in creating robots bears more similarity to machines like cars or airplanes than to organisms. Thus, we are driven to an investigation of how body and meaning relate. We suggest that meaning is closely related to the strengths and weaknesses of organic bodies of cognitive systems in relation to their struggle for survival. Specifically, as long as four essential characteristics of organic bodies (autopoiesis, metabolism, centrifugal development and self-organization) are lacking in artificial systems, there will be little possibility of the emergence of meaningful sign processes. © 2007, Idea Group Inc. |
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The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creaturesThe question as to how sign processes can be meaningful to artificial agents has been a fundamental one for cognitive science throughout its history, from Turing's (1950) argument from consciousness, to Searle's (1980) Chinese room and Harnad's (1990) symbol grounding problem. Currently, the question is even more pressing in the light of recent developments in AI robotics, specifically in the area of reactive and evolutionary approaches. One would perhaps expect that given the embodied and embedded nature of these systems, meaningful sign processes would emerge from the interactions between these robots and their environment. So far, however, robots seem to lack any sensitivity to the significance of signs. In this chapter we will suggest that the artificiality of the body of current robots precludes the emergence of meaning. In fact, one may question whether the label embodied genuinely applies to current robots. It may be more truthful to speak of robots being physicalized, given that the types of matter used in creating robots bears more similarity to machines like cars or airplanes than to organisms. Thus, we are driven to an investigation of how body and meaning relate. We suggest that meaning is closely related to the strengths and weaknesses of organic bodies of cognitive systems in relation to their struggle for survival. Specifically, as long as four essential characteristics of organic bodies (autopoiesis, metabolism, centrifugal development and self-organization) are lacking in artificial systems, there will be little possibility of the emergence of meaningful sign processes. © 2007, Idea Group Inc.Department of Artificial Intelligence / Cognitive Science (NICI) Raboud University, NijmegenUNESPUNESPRaboud UniversityUniversidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)Haselager, WillemGonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP]2022-04-28T18:59:49Z2022-04-28T18:59:49Z2006-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart238-250http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008Artificial Cognition Systems, p. 238-250.http://hdl.handle.net/11449/22013510.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch0082-s2.0-84899184274Scopusreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengArtificial Cognition Systemsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-04-28T18:59:49Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/220135Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462024-08-05T18:39:10.621090Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures |
title |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures |
spellingShingle |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures Haselager, Willem |
title_short |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures |
title_full |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures |
title_fullStr |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures |
title_full_unstemmed |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures |
title_sort |
The meaningful body: On the difference between artificial and organic creatures |
author |
Haselager, Willem |
author_facet |
Haselager, Willem Gonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP] |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Gonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP] |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Raboud University Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Haselager, Willem Gonzalez, Maria Eunice Q. [UNESP] |
description |
The question as to how sign processes can be meaningful to artificial agents has been a fundamental one for cognitive science throughout its history, from Turing's (1950) argument from consciousness, to Searle's (1980) Chinese room and Harnad's (1990) symbol grounding problem. Currently, the question is even more pressing in the light of recent developments in AI robotics, specifically in the area of reactive and evolutionary approaches. One would perhaps expect that given the embodied and embedded nature of these systems, meaningful sign processes would emerge from the interactions between these robots and their environment. So far, however, robots seem to lack any sensitivity to the significance of signs. In this chapter we will suggest that the artificiality of the body of current robots precludes the emergence of meaning. In fact, one may question whether the label embodied genuinely applies to current robots. It may be more truthful to speak of robots being physicalized, given that the types of matter used in creating robots bears more similarity to machines like cars or airplanes than to organisms. Thus, we are driven to an investigation of how body and meaning relate. We suggest that meaning is closely related to the strengths and weaknesses of organic bodies of cognitive systems in relation to their struggle for survival. Specifically, as long as four essential characteristics of organic bodies (autopoiesis, metabolism, centrifugal development and self-organization) are lacking in artificial systems, there will be little possibility of the emergence of meaningful sign processes. © 2007, Idea Group Inc. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006-12-01 2022-04-28T18:59:49Z 2022-04-28T18:59:49Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart |
format |
bookPart |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008 Artificial Cognition Systems, p. 238-250. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/220135 10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008 2-s2.0-84899184274 |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/220135 |
identifier_str_mv |
Artificial Cognition Systems, p. 238-250. 10.4018/978-1-59904-111-7.ch008 2-s2.0-84899184274 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Artificial Cognition Systems |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
238-250 |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Scopus reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
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1808128960080379904 |