Normas mínimas de qualidade pela ótica do custo total de propriedade : o caso da sinalização de segurança

• Autor(a) principal: Matos, Joaquim José Garcia
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do Mackenzie
• Texto Completo: http://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/26377
• topic: normas mínimas de qualidade; rotulagem obrigatória; custo total de propriedade; sinalização de segurança; CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEIS

Results and contributions: Besides failing in levelling the minimum quality of safety signage, the results show that regulation has ultimately produced a perverse effect by creating imbalances in the market competitive forces that tend to shift end-users' preferences to the manufactures in ´non-compliance´ with the MQS, who remain unpunished and unscathed in the market. Moreover, the regulatory environment has developed some inner characteristics that tend to a continuous state of deterioration. The result analysis indicates a possible direction for improvements if a more complete regulatory process is implemented, with the inclusion of auxiliary legislation that comprises fines for those companies found in non-compliance and a monitoring and enforcement policy scheme that makes quality assessments possible. Objectives: This paper assesses the influence of end-users’ choices on the average quality level and prices of safety signage based upon the initial, and suggested by the literature, idea of an incomplete and lax enforcement policy. Thus, a specific objective must be determined corresponding to the perception of the general market compliance with the MQS and the regulatory process as a whole. Relevance: Safety signs in Brazil are regulated by legislation issued by fire brigades and technically grounded by a minimum quality standard (MQS), namely the standard from the Brazilian Association of Technical Standards (Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas) ABNT NBR 13434, parts 1, 2 and 3. When the vertical product quality dimension is not easily observable, complementary control mechanisms should be established aiming a broad and complete regulatory process, from the emission of the MQS to the process of inspection and sanctioning. In doing this, the possibility of having a counterproductive regulation effect in the market is diminished; by the regulatory failure in establishing a minimum quality safety signs’ level, end-users tend to push manufacturers for 'low cost signs’ which in turn are able to meet such demands through the relaxation of product quality levels. Impact: The regulatory environment created over time has privileged safety signs’ manufacturers in ‘non-compliance’ with the MQS, and the constant demand for such products has facilitated the entry of new manufacturers. Cumulatively, the technical inability of enforcement bodies in observing safety signs’ real quality, tends to discourage stricter supervision, ultimately resulting in a complete lack of control of the regulatory process. Methodology: The present study applies the accounting tool of total cost of ownership to examine the end-user influence on the status quo of safety signage using qualitative research obtained via semi-structured interviews conducted to ten distribution companies of safety signs from the states of São Paulo and Paraná.