Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2003 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Economia Aplicada |
Texto Completo: | https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/220210 |
Resumo: | This article analyzes the effect of public electoral financing on parties' announced policies and the distribution of parties in the Legislature. Electoral campaign may be financed by public funds from the government and private contributions from interest groups. When only private contributions are available, the winning policy is biased towards the strongest interest groups' ideal point, but the representation of parties in Congress results in a balanced Legislature. When only public financing is allowed the winning policy is socially optimal, and one party may become preponderant in the Legislature. Finally, if both private and public campaign financing are available then, the winning policy is suboptimal, and one party may become dominantin the long run. Therefore, a campaign financing reform may lead to antagonistic results depending on the role of private contributions and the size of public funds. |
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Economia Aplicada |
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Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativopublic campaign financingelectoral competitionprivate political contributionsThis article analyzes the effect of public electoral financing on parties' announced policies and the distribution of parties in the Legislature. Electoral campaign may be financed by public funds from the government and private contributions from interest groups. When only private contributions are available, the winning policy is biased towards the strongest interest groups' ideal point, but the representation of parties in Congress results in a balanced Legislature. When only public financing is allowed the winning policy is socially optimal, and one party may become preponderant in the Legislature. Finally, if both private and public campaign financing are available then, the winning policy is suboptimal, and one party may become dominantin the long run. Therefore, a campaign financing reform may lead to antagonistic results depending on the role of private contributions and the size of public funds.Universidade de São Paulo, FEA-RP/USP2003-06-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/22021010.11606/1413-8050/ea220210Economia Aplicada; Vol. 7 Núm. 3 (2003); 549-584Economia Aplicada; Vol. 7 No. 3 (2003); 549-584Economia Aplicada; v. 7 n. 3 (2003); 549-5841980-53301413-8050reponame:Economia Aplicadainstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPporhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/220210/201040Copyright (c) 2003 Economia Aplicadahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPortugal, Adriana Cuoco Bugarin, Mauncio 2023-12-13T12:39:01Zoai:revistas.usp.br:article/220210Revistahttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoaPUBhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/oai||revecap@usp.br1980-53301413-8050opendoar:2023-12-13T12:39:01Economia Aplicada - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo |
title |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo |
spellingShingle |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo Portugal, Adriana Cuoco public campaign financing electoral competition private political contributions |
title_short |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo |
title_full |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo |
title_fullStr |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo |
title_full_unstemmed |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo |
title_sort |
Financiamento público e privado de campanhas eleitorais: efeitos sobre bem-estar social e representação partidária no Legislativo |
author |
Portugal, Adriana Cuoco |
author_facet |
Portugal, Adriana Cuoco Bugarin, Mauncio |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Bugarin, Mauncio |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Portugal, Adriana Cuoco Bugarin, Mauncio |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
public campaign financing electoral competition private political contributions |
topic |
public campaign financing electoral competition private political contributions |
description |
This article analyzes the effect of public electoral financing on parties' announced policies and the distribution of parties in the Legislature. Electoral campaign may be financed by public funds from the government and private contributions from interest groups. When only private contributions are available, the winning policy is biased towards the strongest interest groups' ideal point, but the representation of parties in Congress results in a balanced Legislature. When only public financing is allowed the winning policy is socially optimal, and one party may become preponderant in the Legislature. Finally, if both private and public campaign financing are available then, the winning policy is suboptimal, and one party may become dominantin the long run. Therefore, a campaign financing reform may lead to antagonistic results depending on the role of private contributions and the size of public funds. |
publishDate |
2003 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-06-18 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/220210 10.11606/1413-8050/ea220210 |
url |
https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/220210 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.11606/1413-8050/ea220210 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/220210/201040 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2003 Economia Aplicada http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2003 Economia Aplicada http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de São Paulo, FEA-RP/USP |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de São Paulo, FEA-RP/USP |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Economia Aplicada; Vol. 7 Núm. 3 (2003); 549-584 Economia Aplicada; Vol. 7 No. 3 (2003); 549-584 Economia Aplicada; v. 7 n. 3 (2003); 549-584 1980-5330 1413-8050 reponame:Economia Aplicada instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP) instacron:USP |
instname_str |
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
instacron_str |
USP |
institution |
USP |
reponame_str |
Economia Aplicada |
collection |
Economia Aplicada |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Economia Aplicada - Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||revecap@usp.br |
_version_ |
1800221693626548224 |