Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Relatório |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Brazilian Political Science Review |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212016000200501 |
Resumo: | This study focuses on the degree of political dominance exercised on cabinets by the executive chief in presidential systems. According to a debate that began in the 1990s, presidential systems are characterized by a non-collegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president, in contrast to parliamentary systems where a joint decision-making process is prevalent. The key argument of this research note is that, although the majority of presidents have the constitutional power to remove cabinet ministers, the executive decision-making process in presidential systems is not necessarily vertical or based on a non-collegial process. By building a new index, we reveal a significant variation in the executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets. To classify the degree of political dominance of presidents over their cabinets, we analyzed the rules of cabinet decision-making processes as defined in 18 Latin American constitutions. |
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Brazilian Political Science Review |
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Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power SharingConstitutionsdecision-making processpresidential systemsexecutive powerscabinetsThis study focuses on the degree of political dominance exercised on cabinets by the executive chief in presidential systems. According to a debate that began in the 1990s, presidential systems are characterized by a non-collegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president, in contrast to parliamentary systems where a joint decision-making process is prevalent. The key argument of this research note is that, although the majority of presidents have the constitutional power to remove cabinet ministers, the executive decision-making process in presidential systems is not necessarily vertical or based on a non-collegial process. By building a new index, we reveal a significant variation in the executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets. To classify the degree of political dominance of presidents over their cabinets, we analyzed the rules of cabinet decision-making processes as defined in 18 Latin American constitutions.Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política2016-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/reportinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212016000200501Brazilian Political Science Review v.10 n.2 2016reponame:Brazilian Political Science Reviewinstname:Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP)instacron:ABCP10.1590/1981-38212016000200007info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAraújo,VictorSilva,ThiagoVieira,Marceloeng2016-08-05T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S1981-38212016000200501Revistahttps://brazilianpoliticalsciencereview.org/https://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpbpsr@brazilianpoliticalsciencareview.org||bpsr@bpsr.org.br1981-38211981-3821opendoar:2016-08-05T00:00Brazilian Political Science Review - Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing |
title |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing |
spellingShingle |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing Araújo,Victor Constitutions decision-making process presidential systems executive powers cabinets |
title_short |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing |
title_full |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing |
title_fullStr |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing |
title_full_unstemmed |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing |
title_sort |
Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing |
author |
Araújo,Victor |
author_facet |
Araújo,Victor Silva,Thiago Vieira,Marcelo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Silva,Thiago Vieira,Marcelo |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Araújo,Victor Silva,Thiago Vieira,Marcelo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Constitutions decision-making process presidential systems executive powers cabinets |
topic |
Constitutions decision-making process presidential systems executive powers cabinets |
description |
This study focuses on the degree of political dominance exercised on cabinets by the executive chief in presidential systems. According to a debate that began in the 1990s, presidential systems are characterized by a non-collegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president, in contrast to parliamentary systems where a joint decision-making process is prevalent. The key argument of this research note is that, although the majority of presidents have the constitutional power to remove cabinet ministers, the executive decision-making process in presidential systems is not necessarily vertical or based on a non-collegial process. By building a new index, we reveal a significant variation in the executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets. To classify the degree of political dominance of presidents over their cabinets, we analyzed the rules of cabinet decision-making processes as defined in 18 Latin American constitutions. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/report |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
report |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212016000200501 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212016000200501 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/1981-38212016000200007 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Political Science Review v.10 n.2 2016 reponame:Brazilian Political Science Review instname:Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP) instacron:ABCP |
instname_str |
Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP) |
instacron_str |
ABCP |
institution |
ABCP |
reponame_str |
Brazilian Political Science Review |
collection |
Brazilian Political Science Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Political Science Review - Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
bpsr@brazilianpoliticalsciencareview.org||bpsr@bpsr.org.br |
_version_ |
1754302907928281088 |