Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Arake, Henrique
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Alcoforado, Luís Roberto
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Direito GV
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85232
Resumo: Given their economic importance, small businesses enjoy several legal benefits. Among those benefits, Brazilian bankruptcy law has a special judicial recovery procedure for them that, although it was created to be less expensive and complex that the ordinary procedure, it is severally criticized by renowned authors of the field, especially regarding its bankruptcy plan confirmation procedure. To test whether its confirmation procedure is less or more favorable, we’ve used a game theory model called “chicken game” to model the incentive structure of both creditors and the debtor. It was therefore observed that, contrary to what one might imagine, ceteris paribus, without the possibility to negotiate the bankruptcy plan, it’s more likely that a bankruptcy plan more favorable to the debtor’s interest be confirmed in the special procedure, than in the ordinary one.
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spelling Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory PerspectiveA recuperação judicial especial é mais vantajosa do que a recuperação judicial ordinária? Uma análise à luz da Teoria dos JogosSpecial recovery proceduresmall businessesgame theorychicken gameRecuperação judicial especialmicro e pequenas empresasTeoria dos JogosChicken GameGiven their economic importance, small businesses enjoy several legal benefits. Among those benefits, Brazilian bankruptcy law has a special judicial recovery procedure for them that, although it was created to be less expensive and complex that the ordinary procedure, it is severally criticized by renowned authors of the field, especially regarding its bankruptcy plan confirmation procedure. To test whether its confirmation procedure is less or more favorable, we’ve used a game theory model called “chicken game” to model the incentive structure of both creditors and the debtor. It was therefore observed that, contrary to what one might imagine, ceteris paribus, without the possibility to negotiate the bankruptcy plan, it’s more likely that a bankruptcy plan more favorable to the debtor’s interest be confirmed in the special procedure, than in the ordinary one.Em atenção à importância econômica das micro e pequenas empresas para o país, o ordenamento jurídico pátrio prevê uma série de benefícios para essas empresas. Entre esses benefícios, o regime de recuperação judicial especial, criado para ser menos complexo e mais acessível às micro e pequenas empresas, é bastante criticado pela doutrina especializada, especialmente no que tange ao procedimento de aprovação do plano de recuperação judicial. Este artigo pretendeu testar essa hipótese, i.e., verificar se, de fato, o regime de aprovação do plano de recuperação judicial especial é menos favorável do que o procedimento previsto na recuperação judicial ordinária. Para tanto, utilizou-se um modelo da Teoria dos Jogos chamado de “Chicken Game” ou “Jogo do Banana” para modelar a estrutura de incentivos dos credores e do devedor. Observou-se, assim, que, ao contrário do que se poderia imaginar, ceteris paribus, a eliminação da possibilidade de negociação do plano de recuperação judicial especial permite que um plano de recuperação judicial mais favorável aos interesses do devedor seja aprovado mais facilmente do que na recuperação judicial ordinária.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2022-01-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85232Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 No. 3 (2021): set.-dez. (40); e2144Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 Núm. 3 (2021): set.-dez. (40); e2144Revista Direito GV; v. 17 n. 3 (2021): set.-dez. (40); e21442317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85232/80543Arake, HenriqueAlcoforado, Luís Robertoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-01-10T11:06:31Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/85232Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2022-01-10T11:06:31Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
A recuperação judicial especial é mais vantajosa do que a recuperação judicial ordinária? Uma análise à luz da Teoria dos Jogos
title Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
spellingShingle Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
Arake, Henrique
Special recovery procedure
small businesses
game theory
chicken game
Recuperação judicial especial
micro e pequenas empresas
Teoria dos Jogos
Chicken Game
title_short Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
title_full Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
title_fullStr Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
title_full_unstemmed Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
title_sort Is the Special Judicial Recovery Procedure More Advantageous than the Ordinary Procedure? A Game Theory Perspective
author Arake, Henrique
author_facet Arake, Henrique
Alcoforado, Luís Roberto
author_role author
author2 Alcoforado, Luís Roberto
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Arake, Henrique
Alcoforado, Luís Roberto
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Special recovery procedure
small businesses
game theory
chicken game
Recuperação judicial especial
micro e pequenas empresas
Teoria dos Jogos
Chicken Game
topic Special recovery procedure
small businesses
game theory
chicken game
Recuperação judicial especial
micro e pequenas empresas
Teoria dos Jogos
Chicken Game
description Given their economic importance, small businesses enjoy several legal benefits. Among those benefits, Brazilian bankruptcy law has a special judicial recovery procedure for them that, although it was created to be less expensive and complex that the ordinary procedure, it is severally criticized by renowned authors of the field, especially regarding its bankruptcy plan confirmation procedure. To test whether its confirmation procedure is less or more favorable, we’ve used a game theory model called “chicken game” to model the incentive structure of both creditors and the debtor. It was therefore observed that, contrary to what one might imagine, ceteris paribus, without the possibility to negotiate the bankruptcy plan, it’s more likely that a bankruptcy plan more favorable to the debtor’s interest be confirmed in the special procedure, than in the ordinary one.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-01-07
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85232
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85232
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85232/80543
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 No. 3 (2021): set.-dez. (40); e2144
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 Núm. 3 (2021): set.-dez. (40); e2144
Revista Direito GV; v. 17 n. 3 (2021): set.-dez. (40); e2144
2317-6172
reponame:Revista Direito GV
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Direito GV
collection Revista Direito GV
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br
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