Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13880 |
Resumo: | The objective of this thesis is to investigate the acts of the juidicial control agency in the Judiciary Branch, focused on dimension ‘Administrative Judicial Performance’. This thesis aims to complement Taylor’s model (2008) by adding CNJ as a variant on Courts performance improvement, since it implements managerial tools on courts and generates political and institutional impacts. The study is based on the political and organizational context of Judiciary to provide a supplement to the current understanding of the performance measurement mechanisms. CNJ impacts were analyzed from seven aspects of Judicial Reform process: 1. Standardization of structures; 2. Centralized manag ement systems; 3. Standardization of procedures; 4. Centralization of budget; 5. Financing of legal units; 6. Disciplinary proceedings against irregularities and bad conduct of judges; 7 . Meritocratic criteria and promotion of judges. The data was collected through structured interviews with CNJ’s ex and current advisers and it considers the ten years’ time of CNJ existence (2004-2013), providing a longitudinal perspective. Thematic or Categorical Analysis was chosen as the main form of content analysis technique. Data was segmented by questions, previous categories and categories established later. It was found that CNJ has a direct effect on Administrative Judicial Performance by: i) using management tools that allow the courts to improve the internal organization and raise the level of governance maturity; ii) moralizing and supervising courts through frequent inspections from National Justice Comptroller, that aim to solve irregularities and remove misconducting judges. The evidences also identified indirect impacts: i) CNJ is a Judiciary’s actions coordinator, articulating better relations with Executive and Legislative Branches representatives and getting more budgetary and financial resources to courts; ii) CNJ improves Judiciary autonomy by recognizing courts’ management efforts and sharing best practices among other courts, with impacts on infrastructure and the performance improvements. Increased control promoted by CNJ strengthened gove rnance and efficiency of the courts, but with loss of autonomy at first. Furthermore, subsequently, generated a profile change in the indications of his advisers in an attempt to weaken the control and increasing autonomy of the courts. |
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Oliveira, Leonel Gois LimaEscolas::EBAPEGomes, Adalmir de OliveiraCunha, Armando Santos Moreira daSauerbronn, Fernanda FilgueirasMotta, Paulo RobertoSauerbronn, João Felipe RammeltPereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira2015-08-06T18:49:17Z2015-08-06T18:49:17Z2015-06-15OLIVEIRA, Leonel Gois Lima. Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual. Tese (Doutorado em Administração) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2015.http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13880The objective of this thesis is to investigate the acts of the juidicial control agency in the Judiciary Branch, focused on dimension ‘Administrative Judicial Performance’. This thesis aims to complement Taylor’s model (2008) by adding CNJ as a variant on Courts performance improvement, since it implements managerial tools on courts and generates political and institutional impacts. The study is based on the political and organizational context of Judiciary to provide a supplement to the current understanding of the performance measurement mechanisms. CNJ impacts were analyzed from seven aspects of Judicial Reform process: 1. Standardization of structures; 2. Centralized manag ement systems; 3. Standardization of procedures; 4. Centralization of budget; 5. Financing of legal units; 6. Disciplinary proceedings against irregularities and bad conduct of judges; 7 . Meritocratic criteria and promotion of judges. The data was collected through structured interviews with CNJ’s ex and current advisers and it considers the ten years’ time of CNJ existence (2004-2013), providing a longitudinal perspective. Thematic or Categorical Analysis was chosen as the main form of content analysis technique. Data was segmented by questions, previous categories and categories established later. It was found that CNJ has a direct effect on Administrative Judicial Performance by: i) using management tools that allow the courts to improve the internal organization and raise the level of governance maturity; ii) moralizing and supervising courts through frequent inspections from National Justice Comptroller, that aim to solve irregularities and remove misconducting judges. The evidences also identified indirect impacts: i) CNJ is a Judiciary’s actions coordinator, articulating better relations with Executive and Legislative Branches representatives and getting more budgetary and financial resources to courts; ii) CNJ improves Judiciary autonomy by recognizing courts’ management efforts and sharing best practices among other courts, with impacts on infrastructure and the performance improvements. Increased control promoted by CNJ strengthened gove rnance and efficiency of the courts, but with loss of autonomy at first. Furthermore, subsequently, generated a profile change in the indications of his advisers in an attempt to weaken the control and increasing autonomy of the courts.O objetivo desta tese é investigar a atuação do órgão de controle judicial no Poder Judiciário, focando na dimensão 'Desempenho Administrativo Judicial'. Esta tese visa complementar o modelo de Taylor (2008) adicionando o CNJ como um elemento da melhoria do desempenho dos tribunais, por meio da implantação de ferramentas gerenciais e ocasionando impactos políticos e institucionais. O estudo se apoia no contexto político e organizacional do Judiciário para apresentar um complemento ao entendimento vigente sobre os mecanismos de mensuração de desempenho. Os impactos do CNJ foram analisados a partir de sete aspectos do processo de Reforma do Judiciário: 1. Padronização das estruturas; 2. Sistemas de gerenciamento centralizados; 3. Padronização de procedimentos internos; 4. Centralização orçamentária; 5. Financiamento de unidades judiciais; 6. Procedimentos disciplinar contra irregularidades e más condutas de magistrados; 7. Critérios meritocráticos e promoção de magistrados. Os dados foram coletados por meio de entrevistas estruturadas com ex-conselheiros e conselheiros atuais do CNJ e considerou os dez anos de existência do CNJ (2004-2013), fornecendo uma perspectiva longitudinal. A análise temática ou categorial foi escolhida como a principal da técnica de análise de conteúdo. Os dados foram segmentados por questões, por categorias prévias e por categorias estabelecidas posteriormente. Foi evidenciado que o CNJ apresenta um efeito direto de atuação no 'Desempenho Administrativo Judicial': i) usando ferramentas de gestão que permitem os tribunais aprimorar a organização interna e elevar o nível de maturidade de governança; ii) moralizando e fiscalizando os Tribunais por meio de inspeções frequentes realizadas pela Corregedoria Nacional de Justiça que objetiva a resolução das irregularidades e o afastamento dos magistrados com más condutas no exercício do cargo. As evidências identificaram também impactos indiretos: i) o CNJ como um coordenador de ações do Judiciário, articulando melhor as relações com os representantes do Executivo e do Legislativo na obtenção de mais recursos orçamentários e financeiros para os tribunais; ii) o CNJ aumenta a autonomia do Judiciário reconhecendo os esforços de gestão dos tribunais e compartilhando as melhores práticas com os outros tribunais, com impactos na melhoria de infraestrutura e no desempenho. O aumento de controle promovido pelo CNJ reforçou a governança e a eficiência dos tribunais, mas com perca de autonomia num primeiro momento. Por outro lado, num segundo momento, possibilitou uma mudança de perfil nas indicações de seus conselheiros numa tentativa de enfraquecer o controle e aumentar autonomia dos tribunais.porGestãoCNJJudiciárioJustiça estadualAmbiente institucional judicialManagementJudiciaryState courtInstitutional Environment JudicialAdministração de empresasOrganização judiciáriaControle administrativoPoder judiciárioTransparência na administração públicaDesempenhoControles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? 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|
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual |
title |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual |
spellingShingle |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual Oliveira, Leonel Gois Lima Gestão CNJ Judiciário Justiça estadual Ambiente institucional judicial Management Judiciary State court Institutional Environment Judicial Administração de empresas Organização judiciária Controle administrativo Poder judiciário Transparência na administração pública Desempenho |
title_short |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual |
title_full |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual |
title_fullStr |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual |
title_full_unstemmed |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual |
title_sort |
Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual |
author |
Oliveira, Leonel Gois Lima |
author_facet |
Oliveira, Leonel Gois Lima |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EBAPE |
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv |
Gomes, Adalmir de Oliveira Cunha, Armando Santos Moreira da Sauerbronn, Fernanda Filgueiras Motta, Paulo Roberto Sauerbronn, João Felipe Rammelt |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Oliveira, Leonel Gois Lima |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira |
contributor_str_mv |
Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Gestão CNJ Judiciário Justiça estadual Ambiente institucional judicial |
topic |
Gestão CNJ Judiciário Justiça estadual Ambiente institucional judicial Management Judiciary State court Institutional Environment Judicial Administração de empresas Organização judiciária Controle administrativo Poder judiciário Transparência na administração pública Desempenho |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Management Judiciary State court Institutional Environment Judicial |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Administração de empresas |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Organização judiciária Controle administrativo Poder judiciário Transparência na administração pública Desempenho |
description |
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the acts of the juidicial control agency in the Judiciary Branch, focused on dimension ‘Administrative Judicial Performance’. This thesis aims to complement Taylor’s model (2008) by adding CNJ as a variant on Courts performance improvement, since it implements managerial tools on courts and generates political and institutional impacts. The study is based on the political and organizational context of Judiciary to provide a supplement to the current understanding of the performance measurement mechanisms. CNJ impacts were analyzed from seven aspects of Judicial Reform process: 1. Standardization of structures; 2. Centralized manag ement systems; 3. Standardization of procedures; 4. Centralization of budget; 5. Financing of legal units; 6. Disciplinary proceedings against irregularities and bad conduct of judges; 7 . Meritocratic criteria and promotion of judges. The data was collected through structured interviews with CNJ’s ex and current advisers and it considers the ten years’ time of CNJ existence (2004-2013), providing a longitudinal perspective. Thematic or Categorical Analysis was chosen as the main form of content analysis technique. Data was segmented by questions, previous categories and categories established later. It was found that CNJ has a direct effect on Administrative Judicial Performance by: i) using management tools that allow the courts to improve the internal organization and raise the level of governance maturity; ii) moralizing and supervising courts through frequent inspections from National Justice Comptroller, that aim to solve irregularities and remove misconducting judges. The evidences also identified indirect impacts: i) CNJ is a Judiciary’s actions coordinator, articulating better relations with Executive and Legislative Branches representatives and getting more budgetary and financial resources to courts; ii) CNJ improves Judiciary autonomy by recognizing courts’ management efforts and sharing best practices among other courts, with impacts on infrastructure and the performance improvements. Increased control promoted by CNJ strengthened gove rnance and efficiency of the courts, but with loss of autonomy at first. Furthermore, subsequently, generated a profile change in the indications of his advisers in an attempt to weaken the control and increasing autonomy of the courts. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2015-08-06T18:49:17Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2015-08-06T18:49:17Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2015-06-15 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv |
OLIVEIRA, Leonel Gois Lima. Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual. Tese (Doutorado em Administração) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2015. |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13880 |
identifier_str_mv |
OLIVEIRA, Leonel Gois Lima. Controles sobre o Judiciário geram governança e eficiência? Estudo sobre o CNJ e a Justiça Estadual. Tese (Doutorado em Administração) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2015. |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13880 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
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Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
collection |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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