Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13231 |
Resumo: | Reading Warheit und Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999) and more specifically what Jürgen Habermas writes in the ”Introduction” to his recent book (not yet published in English), I will try to explain his answer to the epistemological problem of realism: how can we conciliate both the postulate of a world that is independent of our descriptions, a single objective world, and the philosophy of language discovery according to which we have no direct access, non-mediated by language, to ”naked” reality. What I will try to explain then is what made Habermas proceed to a revision that connects the concept of rational acceptability to a pragmatic conception of truth, but without assimilating here “truth” to an “ideal assertibility”. I will simply reconstruct what Habermas had alredy said, in 1996, in his essay on Rorty’s neopragmatism (“Rorty’s pragmatische Wende”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, nº 44, p. 715-741), reprinted in chapter 5 of Warheit und Rechtfertigung (the Englsh version of this essay was published in HABERMAS, On the Pragmatics of Communication [edited by Maeve COOKE], Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, p. 343-382). Rorty’s naturalistic strategy, insists here Habermas, “leads to a categorical leveling of distinctions of such a kind that our descriptions lose their sensitivity for differences that, in practice, do make a difference.” |
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Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic TurnRealismo após a Reviravolta Lingüístico-PragmáticaHabermas(anti-)realismLinguistic-Pragmatic TurntruthRortyHabermas(anti-)realismoreviravolta lingüístico-pragmáticaverdadeRortyReading Warheit und Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999) and more specifically what Jürgen Habermas writes in the ”Introduction” to his recent book (not yet published in English), I will try to explain his answer to the epistemological problem of realism: how can we conciliate both the postulate of a world that is independent of our descriptions, a single objective world, and the philosophy of language discovery according to which we have no direct access, non-mediated by language, to ”naked” reality. What I will try to explain then is what made Habermas proceed to a revision that connects the concept of rational acceptability to a pragmatic conception of truth, but without assimilating here “truth” to an “ideal assertibility”. I will simply reconstruct what Habermas had alredy said, in 1996, in his essay on Rorty’s neopragmatism (“Rorty’s pragmatische Wende”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, nº 44, p. 715-741), reprinted in chapter 5 of Warheit und Rechtfertigung (the Englsh version of this essay was published in HABERMAS, On the Pragmatics of Communication [edited by Maeve COOKE], Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, p. 343-382). Rorty’s naturalistic strategy, insists here Habermas, “leads to a categorical leveling of distinctions of such a kind that our descriptions lose their sensitivity for differences that, in practice, do make a difference.”Partindo da obra Warheit und Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999) de J. Habermas, e mais especificamente das explicitações dadas em sua “Introdução”, explicito a resposta dada por Habermas à questão epistemológica do realismo: como conciliar ao mesmo tempo o postulado de um mundo independente de nossas descrições, e idêntico para todos os observadores, e a descoberta da filosofia da linguagem, segundo a qual não temos um acesso direto, não mediatizado pela linguagem, à realidade “nua”. Ou seja, explicito como ele foi conduzido a proceder a uma revisão que liga agora o conceito de aceitabilidade racional a um conceito pragmatista de verdade, mas sem assimilar assim a “verdade” a uma “asseverabilidade ideal”. Trata-se, portanto, de explicitar o que Habermas já tinha elaborado em 1996, no seu ensaio sobre o neopramatismo de Richard Rorty (“Rorty’s pragmatische Wende”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, nº 44, p. 715-741), reimpresso aqui (capítulo 5 de Warheit und Rechtfertigung) e que foi publicado, em 1998, em sua tradução inglesa [“Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn”], na coletânea de textos de HABERMAS, editada por Maeve COOKE, On the Pragmatics of Communication (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press), p. 343-382. A estratégia naturalista de Rorty, conclui Habermas, “conduz a um nivelamento das categorias de tal modo que as nossas descrições tornam-se insensíveis a certas diferenças que, na prática, fazem uma diferença”.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13231Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2003); 63-78Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 4 n. 2 (2003); 63-782316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13231/9744Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMagalhães, Theresa Calvet de2024-07-01T13:09:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13231Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn Realismo após a Reviravolta Lingüístico-Pragmática |
title |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn |
spellingShingle |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de Habermas (anti-)realism Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn truth Rorty Habermas (anti-)realismo reviravolta lingüístico-pragmática verdade Rorty |
title_short |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn |
title_full |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn |
title_fullStr |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn |
title_full_unstemmed |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn |
title_sort |
Realism After the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn |
author |
Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de |
author_facet |
Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Habermas (anti-)realism Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn truth Rorty Habermas (anti-)realismo reviravolta lingüístico-pragmática verdade Rorty |
topic |
Habermas (anti-)realism Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn truth Rorty Habermas (anti-)realismo reviravolta lingüístico-pragmática verdade Rorty |
description |
Reading Warheit und Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999) and more specifically what Jürgen Habermas writes in the ”Introduction” to his recent book (not yet published in English), I will try to explain his answer to the epistemological problem of realism: how can we conciliate both the postulate of a world that is independent of our descriptions, a single objective world, and the philosophy of language discovery according to which we have no direct access, non-mediated by language, to ”naked” reality. What I will try to explain then is what made Habermas proceed to a revision that connects the concept of rational acceptability to a pragmatic conception of truth, but without assimilating here “truth” to an “ideal assertibility”. I will simply reconstruct what Habermas had alredy said, in 1996, in his essay on Rorty’s neopragmatism (“Rorty’s pragmatische Wende”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, nº 44, p. 715-741), reprinted in chapter 5 of Warheit und Rechtfertigung (the Englsh version of this essay was published in HABERMAS, On the Pragmatics of Communication [edited by Maeve COOKE], Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, p. 343-382). Rorty’s naturalistic strategy, insists here Habermas, “leads to a categorical leveling of distinctions of such a kind that our descriptions lose their sensitivity for differences that, in practice, do make a difference.” |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13231 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13231 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13231/9744 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 4 No. 2 (2003); 63-78 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 4 n. 2 (2003); 63-78 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387420485353472 |