Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13247 |
Resumo: | The explanatory priority of natural science is an hallmark of pragmatism in the Peircean tradition. In his case the pride of place accorded to natural science applied in the first instance to science conceived concretely as an empirically constrained hypothetico-deductive methodology but the privileging spilled over to actual scientific explanations conceived of as converging on a complete explanation in the limit. However, from his perspective this privileging of natural science did not exclude metaphysical explanation but rather required it. In this paper I intend to explore the several different senses of “metaphysical inquiry” in the Peircean project as a step toward endorsing some and questioning others. |
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Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic VisionPeirce sobre ciência e metafísica: visão geral de uma visão sinópticametafísicaciênciapragmatismotiquismosinequismoagapismometaphysicssciencepragmatismtychismsynechismagapismThe explanatory priority of natural science is an hallmark of pragmatism in the Peircean tradition. In his case the pride of place accorded to natural science applied in the first instance to science conceived concretely as an empirically constrained hypothetico-deductive methodology but the privileging spilled over to actual scientific explanations conceived of as converging on a complete explanation in the limit. However, from his perspective this privileging of natural science did not exclude metaphysical explanation but rather required it. In this paper I intend to explore the several different senses of “metaphysical inquiry” in the Peircean project as a step toward endorsing some and questioning others.A prioridade explicativa da ciência natural é uma marca distintiva do pragmatismo na tradição de Peirce. Em seu caso, o lugar de destaque concedido à ciência natural referia-se, em primeiro lugar, à ciência concebida concretamente como uma metodologia hipotético-dedutiva constrangida empiricamente, mas esse privilégio se alastrou para explicações científicas efetivas concebidas como se convergissem, no limite, para uma explicação completa. Contudo, nessa sua perspectiva, esse privilégio da ciência natural não excluía a explicação metafísica, mas antes a requeria. Neste artigo pretendo explorar os diversos sentidos de “inquirição metafísica” no projeto peirceano, como um passo em direção a endossar alguns e questionar outros.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13247Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; No. 3 (2002); 11-21Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; n. 3 (2002); 11-212316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13247/9762Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDelaney, Cornelius F.2024-07-01T13:09:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13247Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision Peirce sobre ciência e metafísica: visão geral de uma visão sinóptica |
title |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision |
spellingShingle |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision Delaney, Cornelius F. metafísica ciência pragmatismo tiquismo sinequismo agapismo metaphysics science pragmatism tychism synechism agapism |
title_short |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision |
title_full |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision |
title_fullStr |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision |
title_full_unstemmed |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision |
title_sort |
Peirce on Science and Metaphysics: Overview of a Synoptic Vision |
author |
Delaney, Cornelius F. |
author_facet |
Delaney, Cornelius F. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Delaney, Cornelius F. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
metafísica ciência pragmatismo tiquismo sinequismo agapismo metaphysics science pragmatism tychism synechism agapism |
topic |
metafísica ciência pragmatismo tiquismo sinequismo agapismo metaphysics science pragmatism tychism synechism agapism |
description |
The explanatory priority of natural science is an hallmark of pragmatism in the Peircean tradition. In his case the pride of place accorded to natural science applied in the first instance to science conceived concretely as an empirically constrained hypothetico-deductive methodology but the privileging spilled over to actual scientific explanations conceived of as converging on a complete explanation in the limit. However, from his perspective this privileging of natural science did not exclude metaphysical explanation but rather required it. In this paper I intend to explore the several different senses of “metaphysical inquiry” in the Peircean project as a step toward endorsing some and questioning others. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13247 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13247 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13247/9762 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; No. 3 (2002); 11-21 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; n. 3 (2002); 11-21 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387420504227841 |