A problemática da limitação de hipóteses de cabimento de agravo de instrumento no Código de Processo Civil de 2015

• Autor(a) principal: Silva, Renata Rodrigues Felippe da
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Trabalho de conclusão de curso
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_SP
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.pucsp.br/jspui/handle/handle/36003
• topic: CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO::DIREITO PUBLICO::DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL; Código de Processo Civil; Agravo de Instrumento; Interlocutory Appeal; Brazilian Civil Procedural Law

The Interlocutory Appeal is one of the most relevant resources in the Brazilian Civil Procedural Law, and has undergone constant changes throughout the past century. Targeted at reforming or voiding interlocutory decisions, this resource has faced two crucial problems: if, on one hand, its admission in any hypothesis substantially contributes to the Judiciary System’s overwhelming crisis, on the other hand its limited reception generates situations where the layman needs to issue a certain theme immediately to the higher instance, but has no instruments to do so. Aiming to solve the first problem, the 2015 Civil Procedure Code, resuming the logic implemented by the 1939 Code, has created an exhausting list of hypotheses where the Interlocutory Appeal can be used. Decisions that not fit this list may be attacked at the end of the pre-trial process, through a preliminary decision in reasons or counter-reasons for the appeal. As a consequence, the legal community has faced the rendition of interlocutory decisions that, due to urgency or procedure savings, require immediate renovation, but cannot be appealed with agility. In such situations, doctrine and jurisprudence have been torn between expanding the use of instruments such as the court injunction and applying an interpretation extensive to the exhausting list. Both solutions generate new problems. While the elastic use of the court injunction also contributes to overwhelming the courts (making the reform innocuous in this aspect), the ampliative interpretation leads to juridical insecurity, since, as long as the higher courts do not establish which decisions can be effectively reviewed, the layman will risk not appealing to a certain decision that is not expressly included in the list and, later, such decision is considered precluded. This paper aims at analyzing these situations and, without the intention of being exhaustive, raising suggestions that reduce procedural conflicts