Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4014 |
Resumo: | Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international (trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was expected to read these threats effectively. However, the Commission’s responses to such threats have varied greatly. Building on a fine-grained causal mechanism derived from information processing theory and an extensive process-tracing analysis of seven free trade agreements post-Lisbon, we explain why the Commission has responded differently to looming vetoes. Our analysis reveals that the variation in Commission responses derives from imperfections in its information-processing system, the ‘early-warning system,’ which had to be adapted to the new institutional equilibrium post-Lisbon. Because of this adaption process, factors exogenous to the parliamentary context (‘externalities’) as well as internal uncertainties (‘internalities’) add constant unpredictability to the Commission’s reading of the European Parliament. |
id |
RCAP_1603bd2ef59c90bb32057a96c4f6eccd |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/4014 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade AgreementsEU trade policy; European Commission; European Parliament; information processing theory; trade agreements; vetoSince the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international (trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was expected to read these threats effectively. However, the Commission’s responses to such threats have varied greatly. Building on a fine-grained causal mechanism derived from information processing theory and an extensive process-tracing analysis of seven free trade agreements post-Lisbon, we explain why the Commission has responded differently to looming vetoes. Our analysis reveals that the variation in Commission responses derives from imperfections in its information-processing system, the ‘early-warning system,’ which had to be adapted to the new institutional equilibrium post-Lisbon. Because of this adaption process, factors exogenous to the parliamentary context (‘externalities’) as well as internal uncertainties (‘internalities’) add constant unpredictability to the Commission’s reading of the European Parliament.Cogitatio2021-07-30info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4014oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/4014Politics and Governance; Vol 9, No 3 (2021): Resilient Institutions: The Impact of Rule Change on Policy Outputs in European Union Decision-Making Processes; 74-842183-2463reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4014https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4014https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4014/4014https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/downloadSuppFile/4014/1661Copyright (c) 2021 Marie Peffenköver, Johan Adriaensenhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPeffenköver, MarieAdriaensen, Johan2022-12-22T15:15:37Zoai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/4014Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:22:10.890854Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
spellingShingle |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements Peffenköver, Marie EU trade policy; European Commission; European Parliament; information processing theory; trade agreements; veto |
title_short |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_full |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_fullStr |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_full_unstemmed |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
title_sort |
Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament’s Consent in Trade Agreements |
author |
Peffenköver, Marie |
author_facet |
Peffenköver, Marie Adriaensen, Johan |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Adriaensen, Johan |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Peffenköver, Marie Adriaensen, Johan |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
EU trade policy; European Commission; European Parliament; information processing theory; trade agreements; veto |
topic |
EU trade policy; European Commission; European Parliament; information processing theory; trade agreements; veto |
description |
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international (trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was expected to read these threats effectively. However, the Commission’s responses to such threats have varied greatly. Building on a fine-grained causal mechanism derived from information processing theory and an extensive process-tracing analysis of seven free trade agreements post-Lisbon, we explain why the Commission has responded differently to looming vetoes. Our analysis reveals that the variation in Commission responses derives from imperfections in its information-processing system, the ‘early-warning system,’ which had to be adapted to the new institutional equilibrium post-Lisbon. Because of this adaption process, factors exogenous to the parliamentary context (‘externalities’) as well as internal uncertainties (‘internalities’) add constant unpredictability to the Commission’s reading of the European Parliament. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-07-30 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4014 oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/4014 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4014 |
identifier_str_mv |
oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/4014 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4014 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4014 https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4014/4014 https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/downloadSuppFile/4014/1661 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Marie Peffenköver, Johan Adriaensen http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Marie Peffenköver, Johan Adriaensen http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Politics and Governance; Vol 9, No 3 (2021): Resilient Institutions: The Impact of Rule Change on Policy Outputs in European Union Decision-Making Processes; 74-84 2183-2463 reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799130668002705408 |