Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1995 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047 |
Resumo: | This paper deals with the role of bubbles, having the same meaning as Ponzi games, for implementing efficient growth paths in a closed economy overlapping generations model. It is shown that the well-known arbitrage condition for bubbles, namely that they must yield the same return in equilibrium as real assets, is generically neither necessary nor sufficient for a Pareto-improvement compared to a perfect-foresight equilibrium without bubbles. A consequence of this fact is that bubbles, or Ponzi games, are not Pareto-improving generically, and therefore, it can be irrational for agents to be on the demand side on the market for bubbles, although a bubbly equilibrium could exist. |
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Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic EfficiencyBubblesDynamic EfficiencyPonzi GamesPay-As-You-Go SystemsThis paper deals with the role of bubbles, having the same meaning as Ponzi games, for implementing efficient growth paths in a closed economy overlapping generations model. It is shown that the well-known arbitrage condition for bubbles, namely that they must yield the same return in equilibrium as real assets, is generically neither necessary nor sufficient for a Pareto-improvement compared to a perfect-foresight equilibrium without bubbles. A consequence of this fact is that bubbles, or Ponzi games, are not Pareto-improving generically, and therefore, it can be irrational for agents to be on the demand side on the market for bubbles, although a bubbly equilibrium could exist.Nova SBERUNLang, Günther2019-11-22T10:56:15Z1995-121995-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047engLang, Günther, Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency (December, 1995). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 268info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:39:12Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/88047Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:48.880660Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency |
title |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency |
spellingShingle |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency Lang, Günther Bubbles Dynamic Efficiency Ponzi Games Pay-As-You-Go Systems |
title_short |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency |
title_full |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency |
title_fullStr |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency |
title_full_unstemmed |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency |
title_sort |
Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency |
author |
Lang, Günther |
author_facet |
Lang, Günther |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lang, Günther |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Bubbles Dynamic Efficiency Ponzi Games Pay-As-You-Go Systems |
topic |
Bubbles Dynamic Efficiency Ponzi Games Pay-As-You-Go Systems |
description |
This paper deals with the role of bubbles, having the same meaning as Ponzi games, for implementing efficient growth paths in a closed economy overlapping generations model. It is shown that the well-known arbitrage condition for bubbles, namely that they must yield the same return in equilibrium as real assets, is generically neither necessary nor sufficient for a Pareto-improvement compared to a perfect-foresight equilibrium without bubbles. A consequence of this fact is that bubbles, or Ponzi games, are not Pareto-improving generically, and therefore, it can be irrational for agents to be on the demand side on the market for bubbles, although a bubbly equilibrium could exist. |
publishDate |
1995 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
1995-12 1995-12-01T00:00:00Z 2019-11-22T10:56:15Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Lang, Günther, Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency (December, 1995). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 268 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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