Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lang, Günther
Data de Publicação: 1995
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047
Resumo: This paper deals with the role of bubbles, having the same meaning as Ponzi games, for implementing efficient growth paths in a closed economy overlapping generations model. It is shown that the well-known arbitrage condition for bubbles, namely that they must yield the same return in equilibrium as real assets, is generically neither necessary nor sufficient for a Pareto-improvement compared to a perfect-foresight equilibrium without bubbles. A consequence of this fact is that bubbles, or Ponzi games, are not Pareto-improving generically, and therefore, it can be irrational for agents to be on the demand side on the market for bubbles, although a bubbly equilibrium could exist.
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spelling Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic EfficiencyBubblesDynamic EfficiencyPonzi GamesPay-As-You-Go SystemsThis paper deals with the role of bubbles, having the same meaning as Ponzi games, for implementing efficient growth paths in a closed economy overlapping generations model. It is shown that the well-known arbitrage condition for bubbles, namely that they must yield the same return in equilibrium as real assets, is generically neither necessary nor sufficient for a Pareto-improvement compared to a perfect-foresight equilibrium without bubbles. A consequence of this fact is that bubbles, or Ponzi games, are not Pareto-improving generically, and therefore, it can be irrational for agents to be on the demand side on the market for bubbles, although a bubbly equilibrium could exist.Nova SBERUNLang, Günther2019-11-22T10:56:15Z1995-121995-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047engLang, Günther, Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency (December, 1995). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 268info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:39:12Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/88047Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:48.880660Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
title Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
spellingShingle Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
Lang, Günther
Bubbles
Dynamic Efficiency
Ponzi Games
Pay-As-You-Go Systems
title_short Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
title_full Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
title_fullStr Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
title_full_unstemmed Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
title_sort Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency
author Lang, Günther
author_facet Lang, Günther
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lang, Günther
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Bubbles
Dynamic Efficiency
Ponzi Games
Pay-As-You-Go Systems
topic Bubbles
Dynamic Efficiency
Ponzi Games
Pay-As-You-Go Systems
description This paper deals with the role of bubbles, having the same meaning as Ponzi games, for implementing efficient growth paths in a closed economy overlapping generations model. It is shown that the well-known arbitrage condition for bubbles, namely that they must yield the same return in equilibrium as real assets, is generically neither necessary nor sufficient for a Pareto-improvement compared to a perfect-foresight equilibrium without bubbles. A consequence of this fact is that bubbles, or Ponzi games, are not Pareto-improving generically, and therefore, it can be irrational for agents to be on the demand side on the market for bubbles, although a bubbly equilibrium could exist.
publishDate 1995
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1995-12
1995-12-01T00:00:00Z
2019-11-22T10:56:15Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88047
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Lang, Günther, Asset Bubbles, Pay as You Go Systems and Dynamic Efficiency (December, 1995). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 268
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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