COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.49 |
Resumo: | The concept of responsibility plays a crucial part in the debate between proponents of democratic equality, like Rawls, and defenders of luck egalitarianism, such as Dworkin. In this paper it is argued that the two theories can be combined, and that they should be combined to achieve a theory of justice that puts personal responsibility in its proper place. The concept of justice requires two different conceptions. The two theories can be combined because they deal with different problems of justice. They ought to be combined because, first, luck egalitarianism needs a theory of background justice, and second, a theory of justice must supply an answer to the question of just individual allocations, something that is not provided by democratic equality. Democratic equality and luck egalitarianism solve each other’s problems. The combined theory will lead to allocations of goods that respect both the difference principle and the envy test. |
id |
RCAP_7744c1a2f044aeaa14ebd78d8934fd57 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:journals.uminho.pt:article/4647 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISMASSOCIANDO A IGUALDADE DEMOCRÁTICA E O IGUALITARISMO DA SORTEOriginal ArticlesThe concept of responsibility plays a crucial part in the debate between proponents of democratic equality, like Rawls, and defenders of luck egalitarianism, such as Dworkin. In this paper it is argued that the two theories can be combined, and that they should be combined to achieve a theory of justice that puts personal responsibility in its proper place. The concept of justice requires two different conceptions. The two theories can be combined because they deal with different problems of justice. They ought to be combined because, first, luck egalitarianism needs a theory of background justice, and second, a theory of justice must supply an answer to the question of just individual allocations, something that is not provided by democratic equality. Democratic equality and luck egalitarianism solve each other’s problems. The combined theory will lead to allocations of goods that respect both the difference principle and the envy test.O conceito de responsabilidade desempenha um papel crucial no debate entre os defensores da igualdade democrática, como Rawls, e os defensores do igualitarismo da sorte, como Dworkin. Neste artigo, argumenta-se que as duas teorias podem ser associadas para alcançar uma teoria da justiça que coloca a responsabilidade pessoal no seu devido lugar. O conceito de justiça requer duas concepções diferentes. As duas teorias podem ser associadas por lidarem com diferentes problemas sobre a noção de justiça. Elas devem ser associadas porque, em primeiro lugar, o igualitarismo da sorte precisa de uma teoria de fundo da justiça, e em segundo lugar, a teoria da justiça deve fornecer uma resposta à questão da distribuicão individual justa, algo que não é esclarecido pela igualdade democrática. Cada uma das duas teorias, a igualdade democrática e o igualitarismo da sorte, resolve os problemas da outra. A teoria associada levará a uma distribuição de bens que respeita o princípio de diferença e o teste da inveja.Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho2023-09-26info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttps://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.49eng2184-25822184-2574Lindblom, Larsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-29T10:56:29Zoai:journals.uminho.pt:article/4647Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:58:41.140894Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM ASSOCIANDO A IGUALDADE DEMOCRÁTICA E O IGUALITARISMO DA SORTE |
title |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM |
spellingShingle |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM Lindblom, Lars Original Articles |
title_short |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM |
title_full |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM |
title_fullStr |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM |
title_full_unstemmed |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM |
title_sort |
COMBINING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM |
author |
Lindblom, Lars |
author_facet |
Lindblom, Lars |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lindblom, Lars |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Original Articles |
topic |
Original Articles |
description |
The concept of responsibility plays a crucial part in the debate between proponents of democratic equality, like Rawls, and defenders of luck egalitarianism, such as Dworkin. In this paper it is argued that the two theories can be combined, and that they should be combined to achieve a theory of justice that puts personal responsibility in its proper place. The concept of justice requires two different conceptions. The two theories can be combined because they deal with different problems of justice. They ought to be combined because, first, luck egalitarianism needs a theory of background justice, and second, a theory of justice must supply an answer to the question of just individual allocations, something that is not provided by democratic equality. Democratic equality and luck egalitarianism solve each other’s problems. The combined theory will lead to allocations of goods that respect both the difference principle and the envy test. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-09-26 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.49 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.49 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2184-2582 2184-2574 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799137071272558592 |