DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: James, Michael Rabinder
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.185
Resumo: Arash Abizadeh argues that all coercive enforcement of borders is democratically illegitimate, since foreigners do not participate in the creation of border laws. It is irrelevant whether the border laws are substantively just or unjust, whether the state enforcing them is affluent or poor, and whether the individual being coerced autonomously chooses to cross the border or is forced by desperate circumstances to do so. His argument involves (1) a foundational commitment to individual autonomy; (2) a normative premise that coercion requires democratic legitimation; (3) and an empirical premise that border enforcement laws subject all foreigners to state coercion. In this essay, I contest each of these components. I challenge the empirical premise through examples illustrating the empirical limits to state coercion over foreigners. I contest the normative premise by showing that state coercion requires democratic legitimation only for those involuntarily and indefinitely subject to it. Finally, I challenge the commitment to individual autonomy as foundational to political legitimacy by distinguishing political legitimacy from political authority. I conclude by demonstrating how my critique renders a more plausible account of the normative limits of border coercion, one that coheres more readily with stances advanced by Javier Hidalgo and Abizadeh himself.
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spelling DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEHLEGITIMIDADE DEMOCRÁTICA E FRONTEIRAS COERCIVAMENTE IMPOSTAS: AVALIANDO O ARGUMENTO DE ARASH ABIZADEHOriginal ArticlesArash Abizadeh argues that all coercive enforcement of borders is democratically illegitimate, since foreigners do not participate in the creation of border laws. It is irrelevant whether the border laws are substantively just or unjust, whether the state enforcing them is affluent or poor, and whether the individual being coerced autonomously chooses to cross the border or is forced by desperate circumstances to do so. His argument involves (1) a foundational commitment to individual autonomy; (2) a normative premise that coercion requires democratic legitimation; (3) and an empirical premise that border enforcement laws subject all foreigners to state coercion. In this essay, I contest each of these components. I challenge the empirical premise through examples illustrating the empirical limits to state coercion over foreigners. I contest the normative premise by showing that state coercion requires democratic legitimation only for those involuntarily and indefinitely subject to it. Finally, I challenge the commitment to individual autonomy as foundational to political legitimacy by distinguishing political legitimacy from political authority. I conclude by demonstrating how my critique renders a more plausible account of the normative limits of border coercion, one that coheres more readily with stances advanced by Javier Hidalgo and Abizadeh himself.Arash Abizadeh defende que toda a imposição coerciva de fronteiras é democraticamente ilegítima, uma vez que os cidadãos estrangeiros não participam na criação de legislação em matéria fronteiriça. É irrelevante se tal legislação é substancialmente justa ou injusta, se o estado que impõe as fronteiras é rico ou pobre, e se o indivíduo coagido decide autonomamente cruzar a fronteira ou se a tal é obrigado por circunstâncias de força maior. O seu argumento implica (1) um compromisso base para com a autonomia individual; (2) uma premissa normativa de que a coerção requer legitimação democrática; (3) e uma premissa empírica de que as leis de imposição de fronteiras sujeitam todos os estrangeiros a coerção por parte do estado. Neste artigo, discuto cada um destes componentes. Contesto a premissa empírica através de exemplos que ilustram os limites empíricos da coerção estatal sobre estrangeiros. Coloco ainda em causa a premissa normativa ao demonstrar que a coerção estatal requer legitimação democrática apenas para aqueles que a ela estão involuntária e indefinidamente sujeitos. Finalmente, contesto que o compromisso para com a autonomia individual seja a base para a legitimidade política ao distinguir legitimidade política de autoridade política. Termino demonstrando que a minha crítica oferece uma descrição mais plausível dos limites normativos à coerção fronteiriça; uma crítica que se revela mais coerente com as posições defendidas por Javier Hidalgo e pelo próprio Abizadeh.Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho2023-09-30info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttps://doi.org/10.21814/eps.4.1.185eng2184-25822184-2574James, Michael Rabinderinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-29T10:56:43Zoai:journals.uminho.pt:article/5321Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:58:42.997853Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
LEGITIMIDADE DEMOCRÁTICA E FRONTEIRAS COERCIVAMENTE IMPOSTAS: AVALIANDO O ARGUMENTO DE ARASH ABIZADEH
title DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
spellingShingle DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
James, Michael Rabinder
Original Articles
title_short DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
title_full DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
title_fullStr DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
title_full_unstemmed DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
title_sort DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS: ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT OF ARASH ABIZADEH
author James, Michael Rabinder
author_facet James, Michael Rabinder
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv James, Michael Rabinder
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Original Articles
topic Original Articles
description Arash Abizadeh argues that all coercive enforcement of borders is democratically illegitimate, since foreigners do not participate in the creation of border laws. It is irrelevant whether the border laws are substantively just or unjust, whether the state enforcing them is affluent or poor, and whether the individual being coerced autonomously chooses to cross the border or is forced by desperate circumstances to do so. His argument involves (1) a foundational commitment to individual autonomy; (2) a normative premise that coercion requires democratic legitimation; (3) and an empirical premise that border enforcement laws subject all foreigners to state coercion. In this essay, I contest each of these components. I challenge the empirical premise through examples illustrating the empirical limits to state coercion over foreigners. I contest the normative premise by showing that state coercion requires democratic legitimation only for those involuntarily and indefinitely subject to it. Finally, I challenge the commitment to individual autonomy as foundational to political legitimacy by distinguishing political legitimacy from political authority. I conclude by demonstrating how my critique renders a more plausible account of the normative limits of border coercion, one that coheres more readily with stances advanced by Javier Hidalgo and Abizadeh himself.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-09-30
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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