School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2008 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25822 |
Resumo: | We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms—the Boston, the Gale–Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms—in different informational settings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, suggesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale–Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is slightly more successful than the Gale–Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas ma nipulation is stronger under the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truth-telling in lack of information about the others’ payoffs—ignorance may be beneficial in this context—the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.. |
id |
RCAP_95579d3f4f10c9ce3a42b26e6646bad9 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/25822 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanismsExperimental StudyMechanism the BostonMechanism the Gale-ShaoleyTrading cycles MechanismEfficiencyWe present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms—the Boston, the Gale–Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms—in different informational settings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, suggesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale–Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is slightly more successful than the Gale–Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas ma nipulation is stronger under the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truth-telling in lack of information about the others’ payoffs—ignorance may be beneficial in this context—the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others..ElsevierRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, JoanaPintér, Ágnes2022-10-28T13:56:16Z20082008-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25822engPais, Joana and Ágnes Pintér.(2008). “School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms” Games and Economic Behavior , Vol. 64, No. 1: pp. 303-328.0899-8256info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:55:20Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/25822Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:09:34.598522Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms |
spellingShingle |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms Pais, Joana Experimental Study Mechanism the Boston Mechanism the Gale-Shaoley Trading cycles Mechanism Efficiency |
title_short |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_full |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_fullStr |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_full_unstemmed |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_sort |
School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms |
author |
Pais, Joana |
author_facet |
Pais, Joana Pintér, Ágnes |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pintér, Ágnes |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana Pintér, Ágnes |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Experimental Study Mechanism the Boston Mechanism the Gale-Shaoley Trading cycles Mechanism Efficiency |
topic |
Experimental Study Mechanism the Boston Mechanism the Gale-Shaoley Trading cycles Mechanism Efficiency |
description |
We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms—the Boston, the Gale–Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms—in different informational settings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, suggesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale–Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is slightly more successful than the Gale–Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas ma nipulation is stronger under the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truth-telling in lack of information about the others’ payoffs—ignorance may be beneficial in this context—the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.. |
publishDate |
2008 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2008 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z 2022-10-28T13:56:16Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25822 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25822 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana and Ágnes Pintér.(2008). “School choice and information : An experimental study on matching mechanisms” Games and Economic Behavior , Vol. 64, No. 1: pp. 303-328. 0899-8256 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799131190596206592 |