Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15704 |
Resumo: | A free daily newspaper distributes news to readers and sells ad-space to advertisers, having private information about its audience. For a given number of distributed copies, depending on the type of audience (favorable or unfavorable), the newspaper may either have a large readership or a small readership. A large readership provides a greater return to advertisers, because ads are visualized by more people. A favorable audience has also the advantage of requiring a lower distribution cost (for a given number of distributed copies), because readers are willing to exert more effort to obtain a copy of the free newspaper and are less likely to reject a copy that is handed to them. We find that when the audience is unfavorable, the number of distributed copies and the price of ad-space coincide with those of the perfect information scenario. In contrast, if the audience is favorable, the newspaper prints extra copies to send a credible signal to the advertisers that the audience is favorable. Overprinting is not necessarily welfare-detrimental since readers benefit from the existence of additional copies. |
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Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print?Asymmetric informationTwo-sided marketsFree pressA free daily newspaper distributes news to readers and sells ad-space to advertisers, having private information about its audience. For a given number of distributed copies, depending on the type of audience (favorable or unfavorable), the newspaper may either have a large readership or a small readership. A large readership provides a greater return to advertisers, because ads are visualized by more people. A favorable audience has also the advantage of requiring a lower distribution cost (for a given number of distributed copies), because readers are willing to exert more effort to obtain a copy of the free newspaper and are less likely to reject a copy that is handed to them. We find that when the audience is unfavorable, the number of distributed copies and the price of ad-space coincide with those of the perfect information scenario. In contrast, if the audience is favorable, the newspaper prints extra copies to send a credible signal to the advertisers that the audience is favorable. Overprinting is not necessarily welfare-detrimental since readers benefit from the existence of additional copies.Springer VerlagRepositório da Universidade de LisboaCorreia-da-Silva, JoãoResende, Joana2018-06-25T09:44:49Z2013-082013-08-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15704engCorreia-da-Silva, João e Joana Resende (2013). "Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print?". Portuguese Economic Journal, 12(2):113-1301617-982X (print)10.1007/s10258-013-0090-2metadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-05-07T01:30:46Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15704Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:18.720511Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? |
title |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? |
spellingShingle |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? Correia-da-Silva, João Asymmetric information Two-sided markets Free press |
title_short |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? |
title_full |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? |
title_fullStr |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? |
title_sort |
Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print? |
author |
Correia-da-Silva, João |
author_facet |
Correia-da-Silva, João Resende, Joana |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Resende, Joana |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Correia-da-Silva, João Resende, Joana |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Asymmetric information Two-sided markets Free press |
topic |
Asymmetric information Two-sided markets Free press |
description |
A free daily newspaper distributes news to readers and sells ad-space to advertisers, having private information about its audience. For a given number of distributed copies, depending on the type of audience (favorable or unfavorable), the newspaper may either have a large readership or a small readership. A large readership provides a greater return to advertisers, because ads are visualized by more people. A favorable audience has also the advantage of requiring a lower distribution cost (for a given number of distributed copies), because readers are willing to exert more effort to obtain a copy of the free newspaper and are less likely to reject a copy that is handed to them. We find that when the audience is unfavorable, the number of distributed copies and the price of ad-space coincide with those of the perfect information scenario. In contrast, if the audience is favorable, the newspaper prints extra copies to send a credible signal to the advertisers that the audience is favorable. Overprinting is not necessarily welfare-detrimental since readers benefit from the existence of additional copies. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-08 2013-08-01T00:00:00Z 2018-06-25T09:44:49Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15704 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15704 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Correia-da-Silva, João e Joana Resende (2013). "Free daily newspapers : too strong incentives to print?". Portuguese Economic Journal, 12(2):113-130 1617-982X (print) 10.1007/s10258-013-0090-2 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
metadata only access info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
metadata only access |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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