Collusion between two-sided platforms

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lefouili, Yassine
Data de Publicação: 2020
Outros Autores: Pinho, Joana
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42736
Resumo: We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
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spelling Collusion between two-sided platformsCollusionCross-group externalitiesTwo-sided marketsWe study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaLefouili, YassinePinho, Joana2023-10-02T18:02:52Z2020-092020-09-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42736eng0167-718710.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.10265685089488930000573442600006info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-10-10T01:41:07Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/42736Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T20:32:00.916306Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Collusion between two-sided platforms
title Collusion between two-sided platforms
spellingShingle Collusion between two-sided platforms
Lefouili, Yassine
Collusion
Cross-group externalities
Two-sided markets
title_short Collusion between two-sided platforms
title_full Collusion between two-sided platforms
title_fullStr Collusion between two-sided platforms
title_full_unstemmed Collusion between two-sided platforms
title_sort Collusion between two-sided platforms
author Lefouili, Yassine
author_facet Lefouili, Yassine
Pinho, Joana
author_role author
author2 Pinho, Joana
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lefouili, Yassine
Pinho, Joana
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Collusion
Cross-group externalities
Two-sided markets
topic Collusion
Cross-group externalities
Two-sided markets
description We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09
2020-09-01T00:00:00Z
2023-10-02T18:02:52Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42736
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42736
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0167-7187
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656
85089488930
000573442600006
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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