A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: Carvalho, Leandro Vinícios, Oliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Economic Analysis of law Review
Texto Completo: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571
Resumo: This article aims to analyze the contribution of contracts with incentives to improve the functioning of the Brazilian food market, in a context of corruption. To do so, we used a Principal-Agent model in a sequential game to design an ideal contract to mitigate corruption in the aforementioned market. Such experiment was based on the “Carne Fraca Operation”, investigated by the Federal Police. The results indicate that the proposed incentives were able to align the interests of Agent and Principal, which reduced the chances of corruption and improved the functioning of that market. Nonetheless, the Brazilian institutional environment encourages the Agent to be corrupt, as the penalties are not harsh and the probability of a corrupt Agent be punished is just 25 percent.
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spelling A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”Contract design "Carne Fraca Operation" Corruption Principal-Agent modelThis article aims to analyze the contribution of contracts with incentives to improve the functioning of the Brazilian food market, in a context of corruption. To do so, we used a Principal-Agent model in a sequential game to design an ideal contract to mitigate corruption in the aforementioned market. Such experiment was based on the “Carne Fraca Operation”, investigated by the Federal Police. The results indicate that the proposed incentives were able to align the interests of Agent and Principal, which reduced the chances of corruption and improved the functioning of that market. Nonetheless, the Brazilian institutional environment encourages the Agent to be corrupt, as the penalties are not harsh and the probability of a corrupt Agent be punished is just 25 percent.Universidade Católica de Brasília2021-09-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por Pares; Peer ReviewedExperimental analysisapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1057110.31501/ealr.v12i2.10571Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-232178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBporhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571/7524Copyright (c) 2021 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Jonathan GonçalvesCarvalho, Leandro ViníciosOliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes2021-09-13T22:59:37Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/10571Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2021-09-13T22:59:37Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
title A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
spellingShingle A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves
Contract design
"Carne Fraca Operation"
Corruption
Principal-Agent model
title_short A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
title_full A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
title_fullStr A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
title_full_unstemmed A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
title_sort A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
author Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves
author_facet Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves
Carvalho, Leandro Vinícios
Oliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes
author_role author
author2 Carvalho, Leandro Vinícios
Oliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves
Carvalho, Leandro Vinícios
Oliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Contract design
"Carne Fraca Operation"
Corruption
Principal-Agent model
topic Contract design
"Carne Fraca Operation"
Corruption
Principal-Agent model
description This article aims to analyze the contribution of contracts with incentives to improve the functioning of the Brazilian food market, in a context of corruption. To do so, we used a Principal-Agent model in a sequential game to design an ideal contract to mitigate corruption in the aforementioned market. Such experiment was based on the “Carne Fraca Operation”, investigated by the Federal Police. The results indicate that the proposed incentives were able to align the interests of Agent and Principal, which reduced the chances of corruption and improved the functioning of that market. Nonetheless, the Brazilian institutional environment encourages the Agent to be corrupt, as the penalties are not harsh and the probability of a corrupt Agent be punished is just 25 percent.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-09-13
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed
Experimental analysis
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571
10.31501/ealr.v12i2.10571
url https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571
identifier_str_mv 10.31501/ealr.v12i2.10571
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571/7524
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Economic Analysis of Law Review
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Economic Analysis of Law Review
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23
Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23
Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23
2178-0587
reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review
instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron:UCB
instname_str Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron_str UCB
institution UCB
reponame_str Economic Analysis of law Review
collection Economic Analysis of law Review
repository.name.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com
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