A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Economic Analysis of law Review |
Texto Completo: | https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571 |
Resumo: | This article aims to analyze the contribution of contracts with incentives to improve the functioning of the Brazilian food market, in a context of corruption. To do so, we used a Principal-Agent model in a sequential game to design an ideal contract to mitigate corruption in the aforementioned market. Such experiment was based on the “Carne Fraca Operation”, investigated by the Federal Police. The results indicate that the proposed incentives were able to align the interests of Agent and Principal, which reduced the chances of corruption and improved the functioning of that market. Nonetheless, the Brazilian institutional environment encourages the Agent to be corrupt, as the penalties are not harsh and the probability of a corrupt Agent be punished is just 25 percent. |
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Economic Analysis of law Review |
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A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”Contract design "Carne Fraca Operation" Corruption Principal-Agent modelThis article aims to analyze the contribution of contracts with incentives to improve the functioning of the Brazilian food market, in a context of corruption. To do so, we used a Principal-Agent model in a sequential game to design an ideal contract to mitigate corruption in the aforementioned market. Such experiment was based on the “Carne Fraca Operation”, investigated by the Federal Police. The results indicate that the proposed incentives were able to align the interests of Agent and Principal, which reduced the chances of corruption and improved the functioning of that market. Nonetheless, the Brazilian institutional environment encourages the Agent to be corrupt, as the penalties are not harsh and the probability of a corrupt Agent be punished is just 25 percent.Universidade Católica de Brasília2021-09-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por Pares; Peer ReviewedExperimental analysisapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1057110.31501/ealr.v12i2.10571Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-232178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBporhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571/7524Copyright (c) 2021 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Jonathan GonçalvesCarvalho, Leandro ViníciosOliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes2021-09-13T22:59:37Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/10571Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2021-09-13T22:59:37Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” |
title |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” |
spellingShingle |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves Contract design "Carne Fraca Operation" Corruption Principal-Agent model |
title_short |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” |
title_full |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” |
title_fullStr |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” |
title_full_unstemmed |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” |
title_sort |
A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA” |
author |
Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves |
author_facet |
Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves Carvalho, Leandro Vinícios Oliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Carvalho, Leandro Vinícios Oliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Jonathan Gonçalves Carvalho, Leandro Vinícios Oliveira, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Contract design "Carne Fraca Operation" Corruption Principal-Agent model |
topic |
Contract design "Carne Fraca Operation" Corruption Principal-Agent model |
description |
This article aims to analyze the contribution of contracts with incentives to improve the functioning of the Brazilian food market, in a context of corruption. To do so, we used a Principal-Agent model in a sequential game to design an ideal contract to mitigate corruption in the aforementioned market. Such experiment was based on the “Carne Fraca Operation”, investigated by the Federal Police. The results indicate that the proposed incentives were able to align the interests of Agent and Principal, which reduced the chances of corruption and improved the functioning of that market. Nonetheless, the Brazilian institutional environment encourages the Agent to be corrupt, as the penalties are not harsh and the probability of a corrupt Agent be punished is just 25 percent. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-13 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed Experimental analysis |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571 10.31501/ealr.v12i2.10571 |
url |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31501/ealr.v12i2.10571 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/10571/7524 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Economic Analysis of Law Review info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Economic Analysis of Law Review |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23 Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23 Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 2 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 3-23 2178-0587 reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) instacron:UCB |
instname_str |
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
instacron_str |
UCB |
institution |
UCB |
reponame_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
collection |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com |
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1798675423216795648 |