Motivação e discricionariedade: as razões de decidir e o contraditório como elementos legitimadores da atuação judicial

• Autor(a) principal: Oliveira, Humberto Santarosa de
• Data de Publicação: 2014
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UERJ
• Texto Completo: http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/handle/1/17221
• topic: Princípio do contraditório; Dever de motivação; Discricionariedade; Decisão judicial; Legitimidade democrática; Adversarial rule; Duty to reasoning; Judicial decision; Discretion; Democratic legitimacy; CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO::DIREITO PUBLICO::DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL

This work aims to demonstrate the repercussion brought up by a rereading of the adversarial rule and the reasoning of the judicial decisions rule, from the perspective of the greater participation of the citizens, and its effects to achieve the expected democratic legitimacy of the judicial act. In order to reach the main point of this paper, the methodology adopted includes an analysis about legal systems of different traditions, civil law and common law, with the objective to outline the perspectives that those systems had seen the duty to reasoning a judicial decision. In this context, the present study converged to the current Law perspectives, started in the second half of the 20th century with the movement of a constitutionalisation and, therefore, an increasing judicialization of rights. One of the main criticism of the current moment, is the broad space for judicial interpretation, opening the doors for discretion, which was opposed and repelled, in light of the parameters leaded by the origins of the institute. After this aspect, it was discussed about the new developments and trends that surround the adversarial rule and the reasoning of the judicial decisions rule, all in order to prove the close connection between such rules. The conclusion demonstrated that both standards compose the basis of the procedural guarantees that legitimating the democratic judicial act. Finally, comments were made about the equivocal understanding of the motivated free conviction rule, and how this view can be changed with the perspectives in the bill of law that represents the new Civil Procedure Code, considering that their provisions enfold a great part of the ideas of this paper