The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19017 |
Resumo: | In the book On Certainty, Wittgenstein discusses central epistemological questions, such as the nature and the scope of knowledge, the distinction between knowledge and certainty, the problem of skepticism, and the dynamic of proposition formation. The author distinguishes between propositions that either count as a rule or as empirical. It is suggested that knowledge is different from certainty; the latter serve as ground for knowledge and certainties are expressed by means of hinge propositions. This type of proposition works as foundation for the formulation of empirical propositions. Hinge propositions are exempt from doubt since they are supposed to be assented on certainties. In order to doubt on such propositions, one needs to indicate in what conditions and contexts a doubt can be raised, otherwise the doubt is not allowed. However, hinge propositions are not absolutely doubtless because they can turn into empirical and accordingly, undergo new questionings. This paper aims to understand the formation and the distinction between empirical and hinge propositions and how they become accepted by the linguistic community. |
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The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of WittgensteinO processo de formação de proposições e a possibilidade da dúvida no Sobre a Certeza de WittgensteinFoundationalism. Doubt. Knowledge. Certainty.Fundacionalismo. Dúvida. Conhecimento. Certeza.In the book On Certainty, Wittgenstein discusses central epistemological questions, such as the nature and the scope of knowledge, the distinction between knowledge and certainty, the problem of skepticism, and the dynamic of proposition formation. The author distinguishes between propositions that either count as a rule or as empirical. It is suggested that knowledge is different from certainty; the latter serve as ground for knowledge and certainties are expressed by means of hinge propositions. This type of proposition works as foundation for the formulation of empirical propositions. Hinge propositions are exempt from doubt since they are supposed to be assented on certainties. In order to doubt on such propositions, one needs to indicate in what conditions and contexts a doubt can be raised, otherwise the doubt is not allowed. However, hinge propositions are not absolutely doubtless because they can turn into empirical and accordingly, undergo new questionings. This paper aims to understand the formation and the distinction between empirical and hinge propositions and how they become accepted by the linguistic community.No Sobre a Certeza, Wittgenstein discute questões epistemológicas centrais, como a natureza do conhecimento, o ceticismo e a dinâmica da formação de proposições que podem valer ora como regra e ora como empírica. O autor sugere que o conhecimento difere da certeza; esta última serve de base para o conhecimento e, certezas são expressas na forma de proposições fulcrais, i.e., proposições que servem de fundamento para a formulação de proposições empíricas. Proposições fulcrais estão isentas da dúvida porque já foram validadas. Para que seja possível duvidar destas proposições, é necessário a existência de um contexto que permita seu questionamento, do contrário não há a possibilidade de levantar dúvidas. Contudo, proposições fulcrais não são absolutas, pois podem vir a ser empíricas e como tal, sofrer novos questionamentos, dentro de contextos específicos. Este artigo visa entender o processo de estruturação e distinção de proposições fulcrais e empíricas, e como elas são aceitas pela comunidade linguística.Universidade Federal do Ceará2013-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19017Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 9Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 9Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 91984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19017/29736Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessde Sousa, Carlos Eduardo Batista2021-07-23T22:28:05Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/19017Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-07-23T22:28:05Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein O processo de formação de proposições e a possibilidade da dúvida no Sobre a Certeza de Wittgenstein |
title |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein |
spellingShingle |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein de Sousa, Carlos Eduardo Batista Foundationalism. Doubt. Knowledge. Certainty. Fundacionalismo. Dúvida. Conhecimento. Certeza. |
title_short |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein |
title_full |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein |
title_fullStr |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein |
title_full_unstemmed |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein |
title_sort |
The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein |
author |
de Sousa, Carlos Eduardo Batista |
author_facet |
de Sousa, Carlos Eduardo Batista |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
de Sousa, Carlos Eduardo Batista |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Foundationalism. Doubt. Knowledge. Certainty. Fundacionalismo. Dúvida. Conhecimento. Certeza. |
topic |
Foundationalism. Doubt. Knowledge. Certainty. Fundacionalismo. Dúvida. Conhecimento. Certeza. |
description |
In the book On Certainty, Wittgenstein discusses central epistemological questions, such as the nature and the scope of knowledge, the distinction between knowledge and certainty, the problem of skepticism, and the dynamic of proposition formation. The author distinguishes between propositions that either count as a rule or as empirical. It is suggested that knowledge is different from certainty; the latter serve as ground for knowledge and certainties are expressed by means of hinge propositions. This type of proposition works as foundation for the formulation of empirical propositions. Hinge propositions are exempt from doubt since they are supposed to be assented on certainties. In order to doubt on such propositions, one needs to indicate in what conditions and contexts a doubt can be raised, otherwise the doubt is not allowed. However, hinge propositions are not absolutely doubtless because they can turn into empirical and accordingly, undergo new questionings. This paper aims to understand the formation and the distinction between empirical and hinge propositions and how they become accepted by the linguistic community. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19017 |
url |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19017 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19017/29736 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 9 Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 9 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 9 1984-4255 1984-4247 reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) instacron:UFC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
instacron_str |
UFC |
institution |
UFC |
reponame_str |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
collection |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
argumentos@ufc.br|| |
_version_ |
1797068845465206784 |