The process of formation of proposals and to the possibility of dúvida no About a Certainty of Wittgenstein

• Autor(a) principal: de Sousa, Carlos Eduardo Batista
• Data de Publicação: 2013
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
• Texto Completo: http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19017
• topic: Foundationalism. Doubt. Knowledge. Certainty.; Fundacionalismo. Dúvida. Conhecimento. Certeza.

In the book On Certainty, Wittgenstein discusses central epistemological questions, such as the nature and the scope of knowledge, the distinction between knowledge and certainty, the problem of skepticism, and the dynamic of proposition formation. The author distinguishes between propositions that either count as a rule or as empirical. It is suggested that knowledge is different from certainty; the latter serve as ground for knowledge and certainties are expressed by means of hinge propositions. This type of proposition works as foundation for the formulation of empirical propositions. Hinge propositions are exempt from doubt since they are supposed to be assented on certainties. In order to doubt on such propositions, one needs to indicate in what conditions and contexts a doubt can be raised, otherwise the doubt is not allowed. However, hinge propositions are not absolutely doubtless because they can turn into empirical and accordingly, undergo new questionings. This paper aims to understand the formation and the distinction between empirical and hinge propositions and how they become accepted by the linguistic community.