A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2014 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371 |
Resumo: | In this paper, I will present one argument against the possibility of conjoining Wittgensteinian semantic or logical pragmatism with the traditional (andnon-propositional) epistemic foundationalism. The argument is based on the observation that Wittgensteinian logical pragmatism includes a view according to which that what counts as foundational (i.e. certainties) comes as a package with what they are ought to support, and thus it is impossible to draw a line between foundations and that what is founded, which would be essential to any foundationalist doctrine. |
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A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On CertaintyComentários Sobre a Conjugação entre Fundacionalismo e Pragmatismo Lógico no Contexto de Sobre a Certeza, de WittgensteinWittgensteinOn CertaintyLogical pragmatismFoundationalismDanièle Moyal-SharrockAvrum Stroll.WittgensteinSobre a CertezaPragmatismo lógicoFundacionalismoDanièle Moyal-SharrockAvrum Stroll.In this paper, I will present one argument against the possibility of conjoining Wittgensteinian semantic or logical pragmatism with the traditional (andnon-propositional) epistemic foundationalism. The argument is based on the observation that Wittgensteinian logical pragmatism includes a view according to which that what counts as foundational (i.e. certainties) comes as a package with what they are ought to support, and thus it is impossible to draw a line between foundations and that what is founded, which would be essential to any foundationalist doctrine.Neste artigo, apresentarei um argumento contra a possibilidade de conjugar o pragmatismo wittgensteiniano semântico ou lógico com o fundacionalismo epistêmico tradicional (e não-proposicional). O argumento baseia-se na observação de que o pragmatismo lógico wittgensteiniano inclui uma visão de acordo com a qual o que conta como fundacional (i.e., certezas) vem como um pacote com que o deve-se apoiar, e assim, é impossível delimitar uma linha entre fundações e o que é fundado, o que seria essencial para qualquer doutrina fundacionalista.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2014-03-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 14 No. 2 (2013); 179-188Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 14 n. 2 (2013); 179-1882316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371/13666Copyright (c) 2014 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessJärvenkylä, Joose2024-07-01T13:09:37Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/18371Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:37Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty Comentários Sobre a Conjugação entre Fundacionalismo e Pragmatismo Lógico no Contexto de Sobre a Certeza, de Wittgenstein |
title |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty |
spellingShingle |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty Järvenkylä, Joose Wittgenstein On Certainty Logical pragmatism Foundationalism Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Avrum Stroll. Wittgenstein Sobre a Certeza Pragmatismo lógico Fundacionalismo Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Avrum Stroll. |
title_short |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty |
title_full |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty |
title_fullStr |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty |
title_sort |
A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty |
author |
Järvenkylä, Joose |
author_facet |
Järvenkylä, Joose |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Järvenkylä, Joose |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Wittgenstein On Certainty Logical pragmatism Foundationalism Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Avrum Stroll. Wittgenstein Sobre a Certeza Pragmatismo lógico Fundacionalismo Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Avrum Stroll. |
topic |
Wittgenstein On Certainty Logical pragmatism Foundationalism Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Avrum Stroll. Wittgenstein Sobre a Certeza Pragmatismo lógico Fundacionalismo Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Avrum Stroll. |
description |
In this paper, I will present one argument against the possibility of conjoining Wittgensteinian semantic or logical pragmatism with the traditional (andnon-propositional) epistemic foundationalism. The argument is based on the observation that Wittgensteinian logical pragmatism includes a view according to which that what counts as foundational (i.e. certainties) comes as a package with what they are ought to support, and thus it is impossible to draw a line between foundations and that what is founded, which would be essential to any foundationalist doctrine. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-03-12 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371/13666 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2014 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2014 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 14 No. 2 (2013); 179-188 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 14 n. 2 (2013); 179-188 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387421350428672 |