Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990 |
Resumo: | Historically epistemology has defined knowledge as universal and infallible. However, tradition has not accounted for solving in a sufficiently satisfactory way the issues posed by skeptics such as the question of existence of an external world outside the mind, the argument from illusion and from error, among others. Consequently, reformulations of the concept of knowledge have been proposed, developing new approaches to Epistemology. Fallibilist theories are found among the new approaches proposed, they defend that knowledge is fallible, and that our beliefs are nullified and in need of revision. This paper aims to describe the foundationalist theory of justification, both in its origin, including the proposed infallibility, as the subsequent reformulation. Foundationalism was one of the first alternatives to the problem of justification of beliefs, but his proposal to halt a epistemic regress to beliefs infallible led to a series of skeptical objections. Consequently, a weakening of this theory was formulated, namely fallibilist theories which argue that knowledge is not universal and irrevocable, but may be revised and improved. In the first part of this paper, presents the issue of epistemic justification and the problem of return of reasons. Posteriorly, explaining the traditional foundationalism, the way it conceived the epistemic regress as well as the objections to it presented. Finally, presents the formulations fallibilist and as they attempt to solve the problems left by tradition. This paper aims to show that fallibilism entails a way of understanding knowledge in epistemology and in so doing recasts concepts such as universality and infallibility. |
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Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theoriesFundacionalismo: da tradição às teorias moderadasJustification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism.Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo.Historically epistemology has defined knowledge as universal and infallible. However, tradition has not accounted for solving in a sufficiently satisfactory way the issues posed by skeptics such as the question of existence of an external world outside the mind, the argument from illusion and from error, among others. Consequently, reformulations of the concept of knowledge have been proposed, developing new approaches to Epistemology. Fallibilist theories are found among the new approaches proposed, they defend that knowledge is fallible, and that our beliefs are nullified and in need of revision. This paper aims to describe the foundationalist theory of justification, both in its origin, including the proposed infallibility, as the subsequent reformulation. Foundationalism was one of the first alternatives to the problem of justification of beliefs, but his proposal to halt a epistemic regress to beliefs infallible led to a series of skeptical objections. Consequently, a weakening of this theory was formulated, namely fallibilist theories which argue that knowledge is not universal and irrevocable, but may be revised and improved. In the first part of this paper, presents the issue of epistemic justification and the problem of return of reasons. Posteriorly, explaining the traditional foundationalism, the way it conceived the epistemic regress as well as the objections to it presented. Finally, presents the formulations fallibilist and as they attempt to solve the problems left by tradition. This paper aims to show that fallibilism entails a way of understanding knowledge in epistemology and in so doing recasts concepts such as universality and infallibility.Historicamente a epistemologia tem definido conhecimento como universal e infalível, mas a tradição não deu conta de resolver de forma suficientemente satisfatória as questões colocadas pelos céticos, tais como o questionamento da existência do mundo externo à mente, o argumento da ilusão e do erro, entre outros. Diante disso, reformulações no conceito de conhecimento têm sido admitidas, dando origem a novas abordagens em Epistemologia. Entre as novas abordagens propostas estão as teorias falibilistas, que defendem o conhecimento como falível e nossas crenças anuláveis e revisáveis. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo explicitar a teoria da justificação fundacionalista, tanto na sua origem, com as propostas infalibilistas, quanto as posteriores reformulações. O fundacionalismo foi uma das primeiras alternativas ao problema da justificação de crenças, mas sua proposta de deter o regresso epistêmico com crenças básicas infalíveis deu origem a uma série de objeções céticas. Em decorrência disto, um enfraquecimento desta teoria foi formulado, a saber, as teorias falibilistas, que defendem que o conhecimento não é universal e irrevogável, mas que pode ser revisto e aperfeiçoado. Na primeira parte do trabalho, apresentaremos a questão da justificação epistêmica e o problema do regresso de razões. Em um segundo momento, explicitaremos o fundacionalismo tradicional, a maneira como este concebeu o regresso epistêmico, bem como às objeções a ele apresentadas. E por fim, apresentaremos as formulações falibilistas e como estas tentam dar conta dos problemas deixados pela tradição. Este trabalho pretende mostrar que o falibilismo corresponde a uma nova forma de compreender o conhecimento em epistemologia e, para tal, reformula conceitoscomo o de infalibilidade e universalidade.Universidade Federal do Ceará2011-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-reviewed Articleapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 5Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 5Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 51984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990/29709Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessKetzer, Patrícia2021-07-24T12:26:54Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/18990Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-07-24T12:26:54Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories Fundacionalismo: da tradição às teorias moderadas |
title |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories |
spellingShingle |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories Ketzer, Patrícia Justification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism. Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo. |
title_short |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories |
title_full |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories |
title_fullStr |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories |
title_full_unstemmed |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories |
title_sort |
Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories |
author |
Ketzer, Patrícia |
author_facet |
Ketzer, Patrícia |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Ketzer, Patrícia |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Justification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism. Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo. |
topic |
Justification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism. Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo. |
description |
Historically epistemology has defined knowledge as universal and infallible. However, tradition has not accounted for solving in a sufficiently satisfactory way the issues posed by skeptics such as the question of existence of an external world outside the mind, the argument from illusion and from error, among others. Consequently, reformulations of the concept of knowledge have been proposed, developing new approaches to Epistemology. Fallibilist theories are found among the new approaches proposed, they defend that knowledge is fallible, and that our beliefs are nullified and in need of revision. This paper aims to describe the foundationalist theory of justification, both in its origin, including the proposed infallibility, as the subsequent reformulation. Foundationalism was one of the first alternatives to the problem of justification of beliefs, but his proposal to halt a epistemic regress to beliefs infallible led to a series of skeptical objections. Consequently, a weakening of this theory was formulated, namely fallibilist theories which argue that knowledge is not universal and irrevocable, but may be revised and improved. In the first part of this paper, presents the issue of epistemic justification and the problem of return of reasons. Posteriorly, explaining the traditional foundationalism, the way it conceived the epistemic regress as well as the objections to it presented. Finally, presents the formulations fallibilist and as they attempt to solve the problems left by tradition. This paper aims to show that fallibilism entails a way of understanding knowledge in epistemology and in so doing recasts concepts such as universality and infallibility. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990 |
url |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990/29709 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 5 Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 5 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 5 1984-4255 1984-4247 reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) instacron:UFC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
instacron_str |
UFC |
institution |
UFC |
reponame_str |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
collection |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
argumentos@ufc.br|| |
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1797068845411729408 |