LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2024 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Kriterion (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862 |
Resumo: | The current article is inserted in the domain of legal theory,having as objective to discuss the concept and the centrality of authority incontemporaneous debate around legal positivism, just as offer an alternativeposition, sustained by Pashukanis and based on legal subject (a nearly forgottencategory, overshadowed by the horizon of legal norm and its authority). Thestudy proceeds with a comparative analysis of the notion of authority in legalpositivism’s classical authors (Austin, Kelsen e Hart), pointing out how thisperspective is still hegemonic in contemporaneous legal thinking, even in thecontemporaneous versions of legal positivism. The next step is the contrast ofauthority-based conception with Evgeni Pashukanis’ conception, whose coreis legal subjectivity. By comparing the main theoretical propositions with thePashukanian perspective of legal form, it is noted that authority is a void concept,unable to define the historical specificity of law. Understood as state repressivepower, as socially recognized power or as (self proclaimed) legitimate reasonto act, authority can not provide legal phenomenon’s conceptual boundaries. |
id |
UFMG-10_434a8623d6be08a2388bc9b248b52538 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/41862 |
network_acronym_str |
UFMG-10 |
network_name_str |
Kriterion (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGMPOSITIVISMO JURÍDICO E AUTORIDADE DA NORMA JURÍDICA: UMA CRÍTICA DO PARADIGMA NORMATIVISTAPositivismo jurídicoNorma jurídicaAutoridadeForma jurídicaSujeito de direitoLegal positivismLegal normAuthorityLegal formLegal subjectThe current article is inserted in the domain of legal theory,having as objective to discuss the concept and the centrality of authority incontemporaneous debate around legal positivism, just as offer an alternativeposition, sustained by Pashukanis and based on legal subject (a nearly forgottencategory, overshadowed by the horizon of legal norm and its authority). Thestudy proceeds with a comparative analysis of the notion of authority in legalpositivism’s classical authors (Austin, Kelsen e Hart), pointing out how thisperspective is still hegemonic in contemporaneous legal thinking, even in thecontemporaneous versions of legal positivism. The next step is the contrast ofauthority-based conception with Evgeni Pashukanis’ conception, whose coreis legal subjectivity. By comparing the main theoretical propositions with thePashukanian perspective of legal form, it is noted that authority is a void concept,unable to define the historical specificity of law. Understood as state repressivepower, as socially recognized power or as (self proclaimed) legitimate reasonto act, authority can not provide legal phenomenon’s conceptual boundaries.O presente artigo insere-se no domínio da teoria do direito,tendo por objetivo discutir o conceito e a centralidade da autoridade no debatecontemporâneo em torno do positivismo jurídico, bem como oferecer uma posiçãoalternativa, sustentada por Pachukanis e baseada no sujeito de direito (umacategoria quase que esquecida, ofuscada pelo horizonte da norma jurídica ede sua autoridade). O estudo procede com uma análise comparativa da noçãode autoridade nos autores clássicos do positivismo jurídico (Austin, Kelsen eHart), indicando como essa perspectiva ainda é hegemônica no pensamentojurídico contemporâneo, mesmo nas versões contemporâneas do juspositivismo.O passo seguinte é o contraste das concepções baseadas na autoridade com aconcepção de Evgeni Pachukanis, cujo cerne é a subjetividade jurídica. Ao secomparar as principais propostas teóricas com a perspectiva pachukaniana daforma jurídica, nota-se que a autoridade é um conceito vazio, incapaz de definir a especificidade histórica do direito. Compreendida como poder repressivodo Estado, como poder socialmente reconhecido ou como razão legítima(autoproclamada) para agir, a autoridade não pode fornecer as fronteirasconceituais do fenômeno jurídico.Revista KriterionRevista KriterionKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaRevista Kriterion2024-02-14info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 No. 156 (2023)Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 Núm. 156 (2023)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 65 No 156 (2023)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 65 N. 156 (2023)Revista Kriterion; v. 65 n. 156 (2023)1981-53360100-512Xreponame:Kriterion (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGporhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862/43309Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Kriterionhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBiondi, Pablo2024-02-14T15:55:30Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/41862Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterionPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/oairevistakriterion@gmail.com1981-53360100-512Xopendoar:2024-02-14T15:55:30Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO E AUTORIDADE DA NORMA JURÍDICA: UMA CRÍTICA DO PARADIGMA NORMATIVISTA |
title |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM |
spellingShingle |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM Biondi, Pablo Positivismo jurídico Norma jurídica Autoridade Forma jurídica Sujeito de direito Legal positivism Legal norm Authority Legal form Legal subject |
title_short |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM |
title_full |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM |
title_fullStr |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM |
title_full_unstemmed |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM |
title_sort |
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM |
author |
Biondi, Pablo |
author_facet |
Biondi, Pablo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Biondi, Pablo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Positivismo jurídico Norma jurídica Autoridade Forma jurídica Sujeito de direito Legal positivism Legal norm Authority Legal form Legal subject |
topic |
Positivismo jurídico Norma jurídica Autoridade Forma jurídica Sujeito de direito Legal positivism Legal norm Authority Legal form Legal subject |
description |
The current article is inserted in the domain of legal theory,having as objective to discuss the concept and the centrality of authority incontemporaneous debate around legal positivism, just as offer an alternativeposition, sustained by Pashukanis and based on legal subject (a nearly forgottencategory, overshadowed by the horizon of legal norm and its authority). Thestudy proceeds with a comparative analysis of the notion of authority in legalpositivism’s classical authors (Austin, Kelsen e Hart), pointing out how thisperspective is still hegemonic in contemporaneous legal thinking, even in thecontemporaneous versions of legal positivism. The next step is the contrast ofauthority-based conception with Evgeni Pashukanis’ conception, whose coreis legal subjectivity. By comparing the main theoretical propositions with thePashukanian perspective of legal form, it is noted that authority is a void concept,unable to define the historical specificity of law. Understood as state repressivepower, as socially recognized power or as (self proclaimed) legitimate reasonto act, authority can not provide legal phenomenon’s conceptual boundaries. |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-02-14 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862/43309 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Kriterion https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Kriterion https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 No. 156 (2023) Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 Núm. 156 (2023) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 65 No 156 (2023) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 65 N. 156 (2023) Revista Kriterion; v. 65 n. 156 (2023) 1981-5336 0100-512X reponame:Kriterion (Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) instacron:UFMG |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
instacron_str |
UFMG |
institution |
UFMG |
reponame_str |
Kriterion (Online) |
collection |
Kriterion (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revistakriterion@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1799711182977761280 |