LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Biondi, Pablo
Data de Publicação: 2024
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Kriterion (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862
Resumo: The current article is inserted in the domain of legal theory,having as objective to discuss the concept and the centrality of authority incontemporaneous debate around legal positivism, just as offer an alternativeposition, sustained by Pashukanis and based on legal subject (a nearly forgottencategory, overshadowed by the horizon of legal norm and its authority). Thestudy proceeds with a comparative analysis of the notion of authority in legalpositivism’s classical authors (Austin, Kelsen e Hart), pointing out how thisperspective is still hegemonic in contemporaneous legal thinking, even in thecontemporaneous versions of legal positivism. The next step is the contrast ofauthority-based conception with Evgeni Pashukanis’ conception, whose coreis legal subjectivity. By comparing the main theoretical propositions with thePashukanian perspective of legal form, it is noted that authority is a void concept,unable to define the historical specificity of law. Understood as state repressivepower, as socially recognized power or as (self proclaimed) legitimate reasonto act, authority can not provide legal phenomenon’s conceptual boundaries.
id UFMG-10_434a8623d6be08a2388bc9b248b52538
oai_identifier_str oai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/41862
network_acronym_str UFMG-10
network_name_str Kriterion (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGMPOSITIVISMO JURÍDICO E AUTORIDADE DA NORMA JURÍDICA: UMA CRÍTICA DO PARADIGMA NORMATIVISTAPositivismo jurídicoNorma jurídicaAutoridadeForma jurídicaSujeito de direitoLegal positivismLegal normAuthorityLegal formLegal subjectThe current article is inserted in the domain of legal theory,having as objective to discuss the concept and the centrality of authority incontemporaneous debate around legal positivism, just as offer an alternativeposition, sustained by Pashukanis and based on legal subject (a nearly forgottencategory, overshadowed by the horizon of legal norm and its authority). Thestudy proceeds with a comparative analysis of the notion of authority in legalpositivism’s classical authors (Austin, Kelsen e Hart), pointing out how thisperspective is still hegemonic in contemporaneous legal thinking, even in thecontemporaneous versions of legal positivism. The next step is the contrast ofauthority-based conception with Evgeni Pashukanis’ conception, whose coreis legal subjectivity. By comparing the main theoretical propositions with thePashukanian perspective of legal form, it is noted that authority is a void concept,unable to define the historical specificity of law. Understood as state repressivepower, as socially recognized power or as (self proclaimed) legitimate reasonto act, authority can not provide legal phenomenon’s conceptual boundaries.O presente artigo insere-se no domínio da teoria do direito,tendo por objetivo discutir o conceito e a centralidade da autoridade no debatecontemporâneo em torno do positivismo jurídico, bem como oferecer uma posiçãoalternativa, sustentada por Pachukanis e baseada no sujeito de direito (umacategoria quase que esquecida, ofuscada pelo horizonte da norma jurídica ede sua autoridade). O estudo procede com uma análise comparativa da noçãode autoridade nos autores clássicos do positivismo jurídico (Austin, Kelsen eHart), indicando como essa perspectiva ainda é hegemônica no pensamentojurídico contemporâneo, mesmo nas versões contemporâneas do juspositivismo.O passo seguinte é o contraste das concepções baseadas na autoridade com aconcepção de Evgeni Pachukanis, cujo cerne é a subjetividade jurídica. Ao secomparar as principais propostas teóricas com a perspectiva pachukaniana daforma jurídica, nota-se que a autoridade é um conceito vazio, incapaz de definir a especificidade histórica do direito. Compreendida como poder repressivodo Estado, como poder socialmente reconhecido ou como razão legítima(autoproclamada) para agir, a autoridade não pode fornecer as fronteirasconceituais do fenômeno jurídico.Revista KriterionRevista KriterionKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaRevista Kriterion2024-02-14info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 No. 156 (2023)Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 Núm. 156 (2023)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 65 No 156 (2023)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 65 N. 156 (2023)Revista Kriterion; v. 65 n. 156 (2023)1981-53360100-512Xreponame:Kriterion (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGporhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862/43309Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Kriterionhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBiondi, Pablo2024-02-14T15:55:30Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/41862Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterionPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/oairevistakriterion@gmail.com1981-53360100-512Xopendoar:2024-02-14T15:55:30Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO E AUTORIDADE DA NORMA JURÍDICA: UMA CRÍTICA DO PARADIGMA NORMATIVISTA
title LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
spellingShingle LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
Biondi, Pablo
Positivismo jurídico
Norma jurídica
Autoridade
Forma jurídica
Sujeito de direito
Legal positivism
Legal norm
Authority
Legal form
Legal subject
title_short LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
title_full LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
title_fullStr LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
title_full_unstemmed LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
title_sort LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NORM’S AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVIST PARADIGM
author Biondi, Pablo
author_facet Biondi, Pablo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Biondi, Pablo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Positivismo jurídico
Norma jurídica
Autoridade
Forma jurídica
Sujeito de direito
Legal positivism
Legal norm
Authority
Legal form
Legal subject
topic Positivismo jurídico
Norma jurídica
Autoridade
Forma jurídica
Sujeito de direito
Legal positivism
Legal norm
Authority
Legal form
Legal subject
description The current article is inserted in the domain of legal theory,having as objective to discuss the concept and the centrality of authority incontemporaneous debate around legal positivism, just as offer an alternativeposition, sustained by Pashukanis and based on legal subject (a nearly forgottencategory, overshadowed by the horizon of legal norm and its authority). Thestudy proceeds with a comparative analysis of the notion of authority in legalpositivism’s classical authors (Austin, Kelsen e Hart), pointing out how thisperspective is still hegemonic in contemporaneous legal thinking, even in thecontemporaneous versions of legal positivism. The next step is the contrast ofauthority-based conception with Evgeni Pashukanis’ conception, whose coreis legal subjectivity. By comparing the main theoretical propositions with thePashukanian perspective of legal form, it is noted that authority is a void concept,unable to define the historical specificity of law. Understood as state repressivepower, as socially recognized power or as (self proclaimed) legitimate reasonto act, authority can not provide legal phenomenon’s conceptual boundaries.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-02-14
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862
url https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/41862/43309
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Kriterion
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Kriterion
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Revista Kriterion
Revista Kriterion
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Revista Kriterion
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Revista Kriterion
Revista Kriterion
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Revista Kriterion
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 No. 156 (2023)
Revista Kriterion; Vol. 65 Núm. 156 (2023)
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 65 No 156 (2023)
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 65 N. 156 (2023)
Revista Kriterion; v. 65 n. 156 (2023)
1981-5336
0100-512X
reponame:Kriterion (Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron:UFMG
instname_str Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron_str UFMG
institution UFMG
reponame_str Kriterion (Online)
collection Kriterion (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revistakriterion@gmail.com
_version_ 1799711182977761280

Registros relacionados