Constructing ourselves as moral agents

• Autor(a) principal: Vitor Sommavilla de Souza Barros
• Data de Publicação: 2019
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFMG
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/31951
• topic: Constructivism; Relativism; Agent; Reflection; Practical reason; Filosofia; Metaética; Ação (Filosofia); Construtivismo (Filosofia)

This dissertation is a defence of metaethical constructivism in its Humean or relativist version. In the first chapter, I introduce constructivism in dialogue with tradition and its most prominent contemporary supporters. Responding to realist critics such as Enoch and Shafer-Landau, I suggest modifications to Street's constructivism. The upshot is a qualified defence of Humean constructivism. Next, in chapter 2, I engage with the work of two other contemporary constructivists, Korsgaard and Dorsey, and find their work wanting in argumentative support. In the subsequent chapters, I dive deeper into the foundations and consequences of the theory. In chapter 3, I reflect on the notion of agent that underlies metaethical constructivism. First, in the context of a dispute involving H. Frankfurt, G. Watson and D. Velleman, I propose that the agent be construed as the set of her coherent values, where "coherent" is meant to interrupt the regress faced by Frankfurt's original view. Secondly, I offer a solution compatible with relativist constructivism to the shmagency objection raised by D. Enoch. Then, in chapter 4 I tackle a famous counter-example, Gibbard's Ideally Coherent Caligula. Resorting to contemporary philosophy of language and disagreement, I show that constructivism deals nicely with cases such as that of the Caligula, especially if coupled with an acceptance of non-indexical contextualism. Finally, in chapter 5, I consider the ideal of reflective endorsement of practical reasons by the agent herself. Going against a tradition that goes back to Socrates and apparently resonates within constructivism, I argue for strict conditions for when an agent is justified in questioning her reasons for action via an ample process of self-examination.