Against the anti-closure response to the factivity problem for epistemic contextualism

• Autor(a) principal: Gilbertson, Eric
• Data de Publicação: 2023
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/86155
• topic: Factivity; Contextualism; Closure; Warrant Transmission

It appears that there is an inconsistency in combining epistemic contextualism with a plausible closure principle for knowledge and the view that knowledge is factive. I discuss the proposal that in order to avoid inconsistency the contextualist should reject closure and retain factivity. The proposal offers an alternative to closure and an argument that warrant fails to transmit through inference in the relevant cases. I criticize both accounts. The proposed alternative to closure is not well motivated and leaves unresolved the question of why standard closure should not hold. The argument that warrant does not transmit is based on an inaccurate model of warrant transmission. An important lesson that emerges is that known propositions themselves can serve as warrant for further propositions, which may be known provided they are competently deduced from the former. Indeed it is arguably the factivity of knowledge that accounts for the fact that known propositions themselves serve as warrant. Thus, the strategy of rejecting closure while retaining factivity is a bad one not merely because the proposed alternatives to standard closure are inadequate and transmission failure in relevant cases would not imply closure failure, but because factivity ensures that warrant transmission worries in the relevant cases are unfounded.