¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427 |
Resumo: | In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon. |
id |
UFSC-5_f63da6e24411256a180f3ffe908d7e43 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/42865 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard WettsteinIn this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2016-09-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p42710.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p427Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 3 (2016); 427-453Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 3 (2016); 427-453Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 3 (2016); 427-4531808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427/33916Copyright (c) 2021 David Suarez-Riveroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSuarez-Rivero, David2019-09-13T11:11:50Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/42865Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T11:11:50Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein |
title |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein |
spellingShingle |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein Suarez-Rivero, David |
title_short |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein |
title_full |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein |
title_fullStr |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein |
title_full_unstemmed |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein |
title_sort |
¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein |
author |
Suarez-Rivero, David |
author_facet |
Suarez-Rivero, David |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Suarez-Rivero, David |
description |
In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-09-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427 10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p427 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p427 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427/33916 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 David Suarez-Rivero info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 David Suarez-Rivero |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 No. 3 (2016); 427-453 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 20 Núm. 3 (2016); 427-453 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 20 n. 3 (2016); 427-453 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435112604041216 |