Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Opinião Pública (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045
Resumo: Why would political actors risk being controlled in the future by independent anti-corruption institutions? The article aims to explain what motivates politicians to give these institutions greater independence and power, at the risk of being controlled in the future. Through the process tracing method, the article systematizes evidence regarding the approval of the institutional design of the Federal Court of Accounts in the 1988 Constituent Process. The results indicate that, regardless of the preferences of politicians, anti-corruption institutions gain greater power through threats to the political survival of actors in contexts of future uncertainty. The diagnosis questions whether independent anti-corruption institutions are the product of democratic disputes, since they are not always a direct result of the majority preference of elected representatives.
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spelling Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent AssemblyEntre riesgos y amenazas: independencia y control del Tribunal de Cuentas Federal en la Asamblea Constituyente de 1988Entre riscos e ameaças: independência e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União na Assembleia Constituinte de 1988Anticorruption institutionsHorizontal accountabilityJudicial reviewCorruptionInstituciones contra la corrupciónResponsabilidad horizontalIndependencia institucionalRevisión judicialCorrupciónInstituições de combate à corrupçãoAccountability horizontalIndependência institucionalJudicial reviewCorrupçãoWhy would political actors risk being controlled in the future by independent anti-corruption institutions? The article aims to explain what motivates politicians to give these institutions greater independence and power, at the risk of being controlled in the future. Through the process tracing method, the article systematizes evidence regarding the approval of the institutional design of the Federal Court of Accounts in the 1988 Constituent Process. The results indicate that, regardless of the preferences of politicians, anti-corruption institutions gain greater power through threats to the political survival of actors in contexts of future uncertainty. The diagnosis questions whether independent anti-corruption institutions are the product of democratic disputes, since they are not always a direct result of the majority preference of elected representatives.¿Por qué los actores políticos se arriesgarían a ser controlados en el futuro por instituciones anticorrupción independientes? El artículo pretende explicar qué motiva a los políticos a otorgar a estas instituciones mayor independencia y poder, a riesgo de ser controlados en el futuro. A través del método de rastreo de procesos, el artículo sistematiza evidencias sobre la aprobación del diseño institucional del Tribunal Federal de Cuentas en el Proceso Constituyente de 1988. Los resultados indican que, independientemente de las preferencias de los políticos, las instituciones anticorrupción adquieren mayor poder a través de amenazas a la supervivencia política de los actores en contextos de incertidumbre futura. El diagnóstico cuestiona si las instituciones anticorrupción independientes son producto de disputas democráticas, ya que no siempre son resultado directo de la preferencia mayoritaria de los representantes electos.Por que atores políticos correriam o risco de ser controlados no futuro por instituições independentes de combate à corrupção? O artigo pretende explicar o que motiva políticos a conferir maior independência e poder a essas instituições, sob o risco de serem controlados no futuro. Por meio do método process tracing, o artigo sistematiza evidências quanto à aprovação do desenho institucional do Tribunal de Contas da União no Processo Constituinte de 1988. Os resultados indicam que, independentemente das preferências dos políticos, instituições de combate à corrupção conquistam maior poder por meio de ameaças à sobrevivência política dos atores em contextos de incerteza futura. O diagnóstico questiona se instituições independentes de combate à corrupção são o produto de disputas democráticas, visto que nem sempre são resultado direto da preferência majoritária de representantes eleitos.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2020-06-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion TextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153Opinião Pública; v. 26 n. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-1531807-0191reponame:Opinião Pública (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045/22946Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Opinião Públicainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFonseca, Thiago do Nascimento 2021-01-06T12:59:12Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8661045Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/opPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/oaicesop@unicamp.br||racael@unicamp.br || rop@unicamp.br1807-01910104-6276opendoar:2021-01-06T12:59:12Opinião Pública (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
Entre riesgos y amenazas: independencia y control del Tribunal de Cuentas Federal en la Asamblea Constituyente de 1988
Entre riscos e ameaças: independência e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União na Assembleia Constituinte de 1988
title Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
spellingShingle Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento
Anticorruption institutions
Horizontal accountability
Judicial review
Corruption
Instituciones contra la corrupción
Responsabilidad horizontal
Independencia institucional
Revisión judicial
Corrupción
Instituições de combate à corrupção
Accountability horizontal
Independência institucional
Judicial review
Corrupção
title_short Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
title_full Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
title_fullStr Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
title_full_unstemmed Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
title_sort Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
author Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento
author_facet Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Anticorruption institutions
Horizontal accountability
Judicial review
Corruption
Instituciones contra la corrupción
Responsabilidad horizontal
Independencia institucional
Revisión judicial
Corrupción
Instituições de combate à corrupção
Accountability horizontal
Independência institucional
Judicial review
Corrupção
topic Anticorruption institutions
Horizontal accountability
Judicial review
Corruption
Instituciones contra la corrupción
Responsabilidad horizontal
Independencia institucional
Revisión judicial
Corrupción
Instituições de combate à corrupção
Accountability horizontal
Independência institucional
Judicial review
Corrupção
description Why would political actors risk being controlled in the future by independent anti-corruption institutions? The article aims to explain what motivates politicians to give these institutions greater independence and power, at the risk of being controlled in the future. Through the process tracing method, the article systematizes evidence regarding the approval of the institutional design of the Federal Court of Accounts in the 1988 Constituent Process. The results indicate that, regardless of the preferences of politicians, anti-corruption institutions gain greater power through threats to the political survival of actors in contexts of future uncertainty. The diagnosis questions whether independent anti-corruption institutions are the product of democratic disputes, since they are not always a direct result of the majority preference of elected representatives.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-06-22
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045/22946
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Opinião Pública
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Opinião Pública
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
Brasil; Contemporáneo
Brasil; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153
Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153
Opinião Pública; v. 26 n. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153
1807-0191
reponame:Opinião Pública (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
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instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
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reponame_str Opinião Pública (Online)
collection Opinião Pública (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Opinião Pública (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv cesop@unicamp.br||racael@unicamp.br || rop@unicamp.br
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