Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Opinião Pública (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045 |
Resumo: | Why would political actors risk being controlled in the future by independent anti-corruption institutions? The article aims to explain what motivates politicians to give these institutions greater independence and power, at the risk of being controlled in the future. Through the process tracing method, the article systematizes evidence regarding the approval of the institutional design of the Federal Court of Accounts in the 1988 Constituent Process. The results indicate that, regardless of the preferences of politicians, anti-corruption institutions gain greater power through threats to the political survival of actors in contexts of future uncertainty. The diagnosis questions whether independent anti-corruption institutions are the product of democratic disputes, since they are not always a direct result of the majority preference of elected representatives. |
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Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent AssemblyEntre riesgos y amenazas: independencia y control del Tribunal de Cuentas Federal en la Asamblea Constituyente de 1988Entre riscos e ameaças: independência e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União na Assembleia Constituinte de 1988Anticorruption institutionsHorizontal accountabilityJudicial reviewCorruptionInstituciones contra la corrupciónResponsabilidad horizontalIndependencia institucionalRevisión judicialCorrupciónInstituições de combate à corrupçãoAccountability horizontalIndependência institucionalJudicial reviewCorrupçãoWhy would political actors risk being controlled in the future by independent anti-corruption institutions? The article aims to explain what motivates politicians to give these institutions greater independence and power, at the risk of being controlled in the future. Through the process tracing method, the article systematizes evidence regarding the approval of the institutional design of the Federal Court of Accounts in the 1988 Constituent Process. The results indicate that, regardless of the preferences of politicians, anti-corruption institutions gain greater power through threats to the political survival of actors in contexts of future uncertainty. The diagnosis questions whether independent anti-corruption institutions are the product of democratic disputes, since they are not always a direct result of the majority preference of elected representatives.¿Por qué los actores políticos se arriesgarían a ser controlados en el futuro por instituciones anticorrupción independientes? El artículo pretende explicar qué motiva a los políticos a otorgar a estas instituciones mayor independencia y poder, a riesgo de ser controlados en el futuro. A través del método de rastreo de procesos, el artículo sistematiza evidencias sobre la aprobación del diseño institucional del Tribunal Federal de Cuentas en el Proceso Constituyente de 1988. Los resultados indican que, independientemente de las preferencias de los políticos, las instituciones anticorrupción adquieren mayor poder a través de amenazas a la supervivencia política de los actores en contextos de incertidumbre futura. El diagnóstico cuestiona si las instituciones anticorrupción independientes son producto de disputas democráticas, ya que no siempre son resultado directo de la preferencia mayoritaria de los representantes electos.Por que atores políticos correriam o risco de ser controlados no futuro por instituições independentes de combate à corrupção? O artigo pretende explicar o que motiva políticos a conferir maior independência e poder a essas instituições, sob o risco de serem controlados no futuro. Por meio do método process tracing, o artigo sistematiza evidências quanto à aprovação do desenho institucional do Tribunal de Contas da União no Processo Constituinte de 1988. Os resultados indicam que, independentemente das preferências dos políticos, instituições de combate à corrupção conquistam maior poder por meio de ameaças à sobrevivência política dos atores em contextos de incerteza futura. O diagnóstico questiona se instituições independentes de combate à corrupção são o produto de disputas democráticas, visto que nem sempre são resultado direto da preferência majoritária de representantes eleitos.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2020-06-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion TextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153Opinião Pública; v. 26 n. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-1531807-0191reponame:Opinião Pública (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045/22946Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Opinião Públicainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFonseca, Thiago do Nascimento 2021-01-06T12:59:12Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8661045Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/opPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/oaicesop@unicamp.br||racael@unicamp.br || rop@unicamp.br1807-01910104-6276opendoar:2021-01-06T12:59:12Opinião Pública (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly Entre riesgos y amenazas: independencia y control del Tribunal de Cuentas Federal en la Asamblea Constituyente de 1988 Entre riscos e ameaças: independência e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União na Assembleia Constituinte de 1988 |
title |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly |
spellingShingle |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento Anticorruption institutions Horizontal accountability Judicial review Corruption Instituciones contra la corrupción Responsabilidad horizontal Independencia institucional Revisión judicial Corrupción Instituições de combate à corrupção Accountability horizontal Independência institucional Judicial review Corrupção |
title_short |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly |
title_full |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly |
title_fullStr |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly |
title_full_unstemmed |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly |
title_sort |
Between risks and threats: independence and control of the Federal Court of Auditors at the 1988 Constituent Assembly |
author |
Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento |
author_facet |
Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Fonseca, Thiago do Nascimento |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Anticorruption institutions Horizontal accountability Judicial review Corruption Instituciones contra la corrupción Responsabilidad horizontal Independencia institucional Revisión judicial Corrupción Instituições de combate à corrupção Accountability horizontal Independência institucional Judicial review Corrupção |
topic |
Anticorruption institutions Horizontal accountability Judicial review Corruption Instituciones contra la corrupción Responsabilidad horizontal Independencia institucional Revisión judicial Corrupción Instituições de combate à corrupção Accountability horizontal Independência institucional Judicial review Corrupção |
description |
Why would political actors risk being controlled in the future by independent anti-corruption institutions? The article aims to explain what motivates politicians to give these institutions greater independence and power, at the risk of being controlled in the future. Through the process tracing method, the article systematizes evidence regarding the approval of the institutional design of the Federal Court of Accounts in the 1988 Constituent Process. The results indicate that, regardless of the preferences of politicians, anti-corruption institutions gain greater power through threats to the political survival of actors in contexts of future uncertainty. The diagnosis questions whether independent anti-corruption institutions are the product of democratic disputes, since they are not always a direct result of the majority preference of elected representatives. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-06-22 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8661045/22946 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Opinião Pública info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Opinião Pública |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary Brasil; Contemporáneo Brasil; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153 Opinião Pública; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153 Opinião Pública; v. 26 n. 2 (2020): maio/ago.; 122-153 1807-0191 reponame:Opinião Pública (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Opinião Pública (Online) |
collection |
Opinião Pública (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Opinião Pública (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
cesop@unicamp.br||racael@unicamp.br || rop@unicamp.br |
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1800217018111098880 |