Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459 |
Resumo: | Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims. |
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Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martoneAre conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martoneAre conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martoneIntenções de fixação de referênciaDemonstrativosIntenções conflitantesIntenciones de fijación de referenciasDemostrativosIntenciones en conflictoReference-fixing intentionsDemonstrativesConflicting intentionsFilipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2021-02-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-732317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459/26085Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGómez-Torrente, Mario2021-02-15T20:51:01Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8664459Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-02-15T20:51:01Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone |
title |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone |
spellingShingle |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone Gómez-Torrente, Mario Intenções de fixação de referência Demonstrativos Intenções conflitantes Intenciones de fijación de referencias Demostrativos Intenciones en conflicto Reference-fixing intentions Demonstratives Conflicting intentions |
title_short |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone |
title_full |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone |
title_fullStr |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone |
title_full_unstemmed |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone |
title_sort |
Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone |
author |
Gómez-Torrente, Mario |
author_facet |
Gómez-Torrente, Mario |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Gómez-Torrente, Mario |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Intenções de fixação de referência Demonstrativos Intenções conflitantes Intenciones de fijación de referencias Demostrativos Intenciones en conflicto Reference-fixing intentions Demonstratives Conflicting intentions |
topic |
Intenções de fixação de referência Demonstrativos Intenções conflitantes Intenciones de fijación de referencias Demostrativos Intenciones en conflicto Reference-fixing intentions Demonstratives Conflicting intentions |
description |
Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-02-15 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459/26085 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary Brasil; Contemporáneo Brasil; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 59-73 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567604051968 |