Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127 |
Resumo: | What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason. |
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Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequencesIntention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation.What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-12-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionNot applicableapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-4992317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127/18850Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRussel, Devlin2018-12-04T09:48:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654127Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T09:48:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences |
title |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences |
spellingShingle |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences Russel, Devlin Intention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation. |
title_short |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences |
title_full |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences |
title_fullStr |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences |
title_full_unstemmed |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences |
title_sort |
Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences |
author |
Russel, Devlin |
author_facet |
Russel, Devlin |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Russel, Devlin |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Intention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation. |
topic |
Intention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation. |
description |
What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-12-04 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Not applicable |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127/18850 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567051452416 |