Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Russel, Devlin
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127
Resumo: What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.
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spelling Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequencesIntention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation.What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-12-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionNot applicableapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-4992317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127/18850Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRussel, Devlin2018-12-04T09:48:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654127Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T09:48:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
title Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
spellingShingle Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
Russel, Devlin
Intention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation.
title_short Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
title_full Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
title_fullStr Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
title_full_unstemmed Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
title_sort Intended and foreseen unavoidable consequences
author Russel, Devlin
author_facet Russel, Devlin
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Russel, Devlin
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Intention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation.
topic Intention. Intentional action. Reasons for action. Cognitivism about intention. Deviant causation.
description What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Not applicable
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654127/18850
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 481-499
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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