INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: RUSSELL,DEVLIN
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400481
Resumo: Abstract What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.
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spelling INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCESIntentionIntentional actionReasons for actionCognitivism about intentionDeviant causationAbstract What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2018-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400481Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.drinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRUSSELL,DEVLINeng2018-12-04T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452018000400481Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
title INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
spellingShingle INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
RUSSELL,DEVLIN
Intention
Intentional action
Reasons for action
Cognitivism about intention
Deviant causation
title_short INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
title_full INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
title_fullStr INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
title_full_unstemmed INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
title_sort INTENDED AND FORESEEN UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
author RUSSELL,DEVLIN
author_facet RUSSELL,DEVLIN
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv RUSSELL,DEVLIN
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Intention
Intentional action
Reasons for action
Cognitivism about intention
Deviant causation
topic Intention
Intentional action
Reasons for action
Cognitivism about intention
Deviant causation
description Abstract What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400481
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400481
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.dr
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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