Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Nascimento, Laura
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652152
Resumo: The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition (REC) aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety of cognitive phenomena in which the questionable notion of content is not necessary. It is argued that REC is a promising research framework for cognitive phenomena and deserves further investigation.
id UNICAMP-17_814a43757fdb71259ba9306092e0e2c8
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8652152
network_acronym_str UNICAMP-17
network_name_str Manuscrito (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)Enactivism. Intentionality. Cognition. Naturalism.The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition (REC) aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety of cognitive phenomena in which the questionable notion of content is not necessary. It is argued that REC is a promising research framework for cognitive phenomena and deserves further investigation.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-04-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652152Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 177-184Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 177-184Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 177-1842317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652152/17842Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessNascimento, Laura2018-04-04T12:56:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8652152Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-04-04T12:56:50Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
title Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
spellingShingle Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
Nascimento, Laura
Enactivism. Intentionality. Cognition. Naturalism.
title_short Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
title_full Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
title_fullStr Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
title_full_unstemmed Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
title_sort Book Review: HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism – Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
author Nascimento, Laura
author_facet Nascimento, Laura
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Nascimento, Laura
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Enactivism. Intentionality. Cognition. Naturalism.
topic Enactivism. Intentionality. Cognition. Naturalism.
description The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition (REC) aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety of cognitive phenomena in which the questionable notion of content is not necessary. It is argued that REC is a promising research framework for cognitive phenomena and deserves further investigation.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-04-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652152
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652152
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8652152/17842
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 177-184
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 177-184
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2018): jan./mar.; 177-184
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
_version_ 1800216567030480896

Registros relacionados