Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo (review) |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000100177 |
Resumo: | ABSTRACT The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition (REC) aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety of cognitive phenomena in which the questionable notion of content is not necessary. It is argued that REC is a promising research framework for cognitive phenomena and deserves further investigation. |
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Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.)EnactivismIntentionalityCognitionNaturalismABSTRACT The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition (REC) aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety of cognitive phenomena in which the questionable notion of content is not necessary. It is argued that REC is a promising research framework for cognitive phenomena and deserves further investigation.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2018-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000100177Manuscrito v.41 n.1 2018reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n1.lninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessNascimento,Lauraeng2018-04-17T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452018000100177Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-04-17T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) |
title |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) |
spellingShingle |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) Nascimento,Laura Enactivism Intentionality Cognition Naturalism |
title_short |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) |
title_full |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) |
title_fullStr |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) |
title_full_unstemmed |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) |
title_sort |
Review of HUTTO, Daniel and MYIN, Erik, Evolving Enactivism - Basic minds meet content (2017, MIT Press, xxvi + 328 p.) |
author |
Nascimento,Laura |
author_facet |
Nascimento,Laura |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Nascimento,Laura |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Enactivism Intentionality Cognition Naturalism |
topic |
Enactivism Intentionality Cognition Naturalism |
description |
ABSTRACT The following review presents some of the themes developed in Evolving Enactivism - basic minds meet content. Hutto and Myin's new book on the Radical Enactive approach to Cognition (REC) aims to provide a thoroughy naturalistic explanation for cognitive phenomena. The main themes investigated here concern Hutto and Myin's criticisms of the nature and role that the notion of content traditionally plays in mainstream cognitive science explanations of cognition and their attempt to provide an account for a variety of cognitive phenomena in which the questionable notion of content is not necessary. It is argued that REC is a promising research framework for cognitive phenomena and deserves further investigation. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/review |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
review |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000100177 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000100177 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n1.ln |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.41 n.1 2018 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065445076992 |