FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100115 |
Resumo: | Abstract Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not wear their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay. |
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FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGESFrege's PuzzleSyntactic FormLogical FormNatural LanguageTrivialityAbstract Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not wear their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2020-03-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100115Manuscrito v.43 n.1 2020reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n1.vbinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVALENTE,MATHEUSBOCCARDI,EMILIANOeng2020-04-15T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452020000100115Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2020-04-15T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES |
title |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES |
spellingShingle |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES VALENTE,MATHEUS Frege's Puzzle Syntactic Form Logical Form Natural Language Triviality |
title_short |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES |
title_full |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES |
title_fullStr |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES |
title_full_unstemmed |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES |
title_sort |
FREGE’S PUZZLE IS HERE TO STAY: TRIVIALITY AND INFORMATIVITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES |
author |
VALENTE,MATHEUS |
author_facet |
VALENTE,MATHEUS BOCCARDI,EMILIANO |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
BOCCARDI,EMILIANO |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
VALENTE,MATHEUS BOCCARDI,EMILIANO |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Frege's Puzzle Syntactic Form Logical Form Natural Language Triviality |
topic |
Frege's Puzzle Syntactic Form Logical Form Natural Language Triviality |
description |
Abstract Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not wear their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-03-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100115 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000100115 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n1.vb |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.43 n.1 2020 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065904353280 |