A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Järvenkylä, Joose
Data de Publicação: 2014
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371
Resumo: In this paper, I will present one argument against the possibility of conjoining Wittgensteinian semantic or logical pragmatism with the traditional (andnon-propositional) epistemic foundationalism. The argument is based on the observation that Wittgensteinian logical pragmatism includes a view according to which that what counts as foundational (i.e. certainties) comes as a package with what they are ought to support, and thus it is impossible to draw a line between foundations and that what is founded, which would be essential to any foundationalist doctrine.
id PUC_SP-15_41ded5374c6f90bd86e0e7548043546f
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/18371
network_acronym_str PUC_SP-15
network_name_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository_id_str
spelling A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On CertaintyComentários Sobre a Conjugação entre Fundacionalismo e Pragmatismo Lógico no Contexto de Sobre a Certeza, de WittgensteinWittgensteinOn CertaintyLogical pragmatismFoundationalismDanièle Moyal-SharrockAvrum Stroll.WittgensteinSobre a CertezaPragmatismo lógicoFundacionalismoDanièle Moyal-SharrockAvrum Stroll.In this paper, I will present one argument against the possibility of conjoining Wittgensteinian semantic or logical pragmatism with the traditional (andnon-propositional) epistemic foundationalism. The argument is based on the observation that Wittgensteinian logical pragmatism includes a view according to which that what counts as foundational (i.e. certainties) comes as a package with what they are ought to support, and thus it is impossible to draw a line between foundations and that what is founded, which would be essential to any foundationalist doctrine.Neste artigo, apresentarei um argumento contra a possibilidade de conjugar o pragmatismo wittgensteiniano semântico ou lógico com o fundacionalismo epistêmico tradicional (e não-proposicional). O argumento baseia-se na observação de que o pragmatismo lógico wittgensteiniano inclui uma visão de acordo com a qual o que conta como fundacional (i.e., certezas) vem como um pacote com que o deve-se apoiar, e assim, é impossível delimitar uma linha entre fundações e o que é fundado, o que seria essencial para qualquer doutrina fundacionalista.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2014-03-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 14 No. 2 (2013); 179-188Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 14 n. 2 (2013); 179-1882316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371/13666Copyright (c) 2014 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessJärvenkylä, Joose2024-07-01T13:09:37Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/18371Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:37Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Comentários Sobre a Conjugação entre Fundacionalismo e Pragmatismo Lógico no Contexto de Sobre a Certeza, de Wittgenstein
title A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
spellingShingle A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Järvenkylä, Joose
Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Logical pragmatism
Foundationalism
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Avrum Stroll.
Wittgenstein
Sobre a Certeza
Pragmatismo lógico
Fundacionalismo
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Avrum Stroll.
title_short A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
title_full A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
title_fullStr A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
title_full_unstemmed A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
title_sort A Remark on Conjoining Foundationalism and Logical Pragmatism in the Context of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
author Järvenkylä, Joose
author_facet Järvenkylä, Joose
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Järvenkylä, Joose
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Logical pragmatism
Foundationalism
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Avrum Stroll.
Wittgenstein
Sobre a Certeza
Pragmatismo lógico
Fundacionalismo
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Avrum Stroll.
topic Wittgenstein
On Certainty
Logical pragmatism
Foundationalism
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Avrum Stroll.
Wittgenstein
Sobre a Certeza
Pragmatismo lógico
Fundacionalismo
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Avrum Stroll.
description In this paper, I will present one argument against the possibility of conjoining Wittgensteinian semantic or logical pragmatism with the traditional (andnon-propositional) epistemic foundationalism. The argument is based on the observation that Wittgensteinian logical pragmatism includes a view according to which that what counts as foundational (i.e. certainties) comes as a package with what they are ought to support, and thus it is impossible to draw a line between foundations and that what is founded, which would be essential to any foundationalist doctrine.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-03-12
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/18371/13666
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2014 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2014 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 14 No. 2 (2013); 179-188
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 14 n. 2 (2013); 179-188
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387421350428672

Registros relacionados