Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ganslandt, Mattias
Data de Publicação: 2007
Outros Autores: Persson, Lars, Vasconcelos, Hélder
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25298
Resumo: In their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) of rms to be a factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when rms face indivisible costs of collusion. In particular, we show that if the rule determining the collusive outcome has the property that the large (eficient) rm bene ts su¢ ciently more from collusion when industry asymmetries increase, collusion can become more likely when are moderately asymmetric.
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spelling Asymmetric Collusion and Merger PolicyCollusionCost AsymmetriesMerger PolicyIn their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) of rms to be a factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when rms face indivisible costs of collusion. In particular, we show that if the rule determining the collusive outcome has the property that the large (eficient) rm bene ts su¢ ciently more from collusion when industry asymmetries increase, collusion can become more likely when are moderately asymmetric.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaGanslandt, MattiasPersson, LarsVasconcelos, Hélder2018-07-30T11:05:59Z20072007-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25298engGanslandt, M., Persson, L., Vasconcelos, H. (2007). Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy. Working Papers: Economics. N.º 15, 32 p.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-12T17:30:40Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/25298Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:20:09.593491Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
title Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
spellingShingle Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
Ganslandt, Mattias
Collusion
Cost Asymmetries
Merger Policy
title_short Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
title_full Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
title_fullStr Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
title_full_unstemmed Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
title_sort Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy
author Ganslandt, Mattias
author_facet Ganslandt, Mattias
Persson, Lars
Vasconcelos, Hélder
author_role author
author2 Persson, Lars
Vasconcelos, Hélder
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ganslandt, Mattias
Persson, Lars
Vasconcelos, Hélder
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Collusion
Cost Asymmetries
Merger Policy
topic Collusion
Cost Asymmetries
Merger Policy
description In their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) of rms to be a factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when rms face indivisible costs of collusion. In particular, we show that if the rule determining the collusive outcome has the property that the large (eficient) rm bene ts su¢ ciently more from collusion when industry asymmetries increase, collusion can become more likely when are moderately asymmetric.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007
2007-01-01T00:00:00Z
2018-07-30T11:05:59Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25298
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25298
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Ganslandt, M., Persson, L., Vasconcelos, H. (2007). Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy. Working Papers: Economics. N.º 15, 32 p.
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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