Sustaining collusion in growing markets

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vasconcelos, Hélder
Data de Publicação: 2008
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/3486
Resumo: The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.
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spelling Sustaining collusion in growing marketsThe impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.Wiley BlackwellVeritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaVasconcelos, Hélder2010-11-18T11:50:19Z20082008-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/3486engVASCONCELOS, Hélder - Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. ISSN 1530-9134. Vol. 17, n.º 4 (2008), p. 973–1010info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-12T17:09:59Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/3486Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:05:25.116752Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Sustaining collusion in growing markets
title Sustaining collusion in growing markets
spellingShingle Sustaining collusion in growing markets
Vasconcelos, Hélder
title_short Sustaining collusion in growing markets
title_full Sustaining collusion in growing markets
title_fullStr Sustaining collusion in growing markets
title_full_unstemmed Sustaining collusion in growing markets
title_sort Sustaining collusion in growing markets
author Vasconcelos, Hélder
author_facet Vasconcelos, Hélder
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vasconcelos, Hélder
description The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008
2008-01-01T00:00:00Z
2010-11-18T11:50:19Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/3486
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/3486
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv VASCONCELOS, Hélder - Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. ISSN 1530-9134. Vol. 17, n.º 4 (2008), p. 973–1010
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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