The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing

• Autor(a) principal: Damo, Homero
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
• DOI: 10.31977/grirfi.v12i2.661
• Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/661
• topic: Sócrates; Paradoxo; Epistemologia; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.; Socrates; Paradox; Epistemology; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.

The present article have the objective of analyzing the epistemological problem of the Socratic paradox. In the first step of this work we will present the problem from a Brickhouse and Smith point of view. After that, we will present an objection done about Socrates telling the truth or telling lies about the knowledge, which is one solution to the problem. After that, we will work in the division of two kind of knowledge where one kind makes the people wise, and one not. Therefore, we will be studying 3 ways of getting knowledge: divinatory, common sense and elenchos. We will present as well an explanation about an article called “Individualism and the mental” from Tyler Burge we will present a mental experiment described by him to demonstrate the non  insular formation of concepts and the idea proposed by him about not knowing the complete concept. After that, in the end, we will present an alternative and complementary idea about Brickhouse and Smith theory to resolve the problem.