The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Damo, Homero
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/661
Resumo: The present article have the objective of analyzing the epistemological problem of the Socratic paradox. In the first step of this work we will present the problem from a Brickhouse and Smith point of view. After that, we will present an objection done about Socrates telling the truth or telling lies about the knowledge, which is one solution to the problem. After that, we will work in the division of two kind of knowledge where one kind makes the people wise, and one not. Therefore, we will be studying 3 ways of getting knowledge: divinatory, common sense and elenchos. We will present as well an explanation about an article called “Individualism and the mental” from Tyler Burge we will present a mental experiment described by him to demonstrate the non  insular formation of concepts and the idea proposed by him about not knowing the complete concept. After that, in the end, we will present an alternative and complementary idea about Brickhouse and Smith theory to resolve the problem.
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spelling The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothingO paradoxo socrático: a ideia de saber que nada se sabeSócrates; Paradoxo; Epistemologia; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.Socrates; Paradox; Epistemology; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.The present article have the objective of analyzing the epistemological problem of the Socratic paradox. In the first step of this work we will present the problem from a Brickhouse and Smith point of view. After that, we will present an objection done about Socrates telling the truth or telling lies about the knowledge, which is one solution to the problem. After that, we will work in the division of two kind of knowledge where one kind makes the people wise, and one not. Therefore, we will be studying 3 ways of getting knowledge: divinatory, common sense and elenchos. We will present as well an explanation about an article called “Individualism and the mental” from Tyler Burge we will present a mental experiment described by him to demonstrate the non  insular formation of concepts and the idea proposed by him about not knowing the complete concept. After that, in the end, we will present an alternative and complementary idea about Brickhouse and Smith theory to resolve the problem.O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar o problema epistemológico do paradoxo socrático. Em uma primeira parte do trabalho, apresentaremos o problema segundo  Brickhouse and Smith, após a apresentação do problema, em seguida apresentaremos uma objeção feita sobre a honestidade de Sócrates e como uma possível desonestidade resolveria o problema facilmente. Após isso, trabalharemos a divisão entre dois tipos de conhecimento onde um torna seu possuidor um sábio e outro não. Ainda, ao longo do trabalho, estudaremos as três vias principais de obtenção de conhecimento para Sócrates: divinatória, senso comum e elenchos. Apresentaremos também uma explicação sobre o artigo Individualism and the mental, de Tyler Burge onde apresentaremos um experimento mental descrito pelo autor para demonstrar a formação não insular de conceitos e a ideia proposta por ele sobre o entendimento incompleto. Feito isso, ao final, apresentaremos uma proposta alternativa e complementar a teoria de Brickhouse and Smith para a resolução desse aparente paradoxo.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2015-12-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/66110.31977/grirfi.v12i2.661Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2015); 186-1952178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/661/377Copyright (c) 2015 Homero Damoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDamo, Homero2020-06-30T18:17:07Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/661Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2020-06-30T18:17:07Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
O paradoxo socrático: a ideia de saber que nada se sabe
title The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
spellingShingle The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
Damo, Homero
Sócrates; Paradoxo; Epistemologia; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.
Socrates; Paradox; Epistemology; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.
title_short The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
title_full The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
title_fullStr The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
title_full_unstemmed The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
title_sort The socratic paradox: the idea know of knowing nothing
author Damo, Homero
author_facet Damo, Homero
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Damo, Homero
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Sócrates; Paradoxo; Epistemologia; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.
Socrates; Paradox; Epistemology; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.
topic Sócrates; Paradoxo; Epistemologia; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.
Socrates; Paradox; Epistemology; Brickhouse and Smith; Tyler Burge.
description The present article have the objective of analyzing the epistemological problem of the Socratic paradox. In the first step of this work we will present the problem from a Brickhouse and Smith point of view. After that, we will present an objection done about Socrates telling the truth or telling lies about the knowledge, which is one solution to the problem. After that, we will work in the division of two kind of knowledge where one kind makes the people wise, and one not. Therefore, we will be studying 3 ways of getting knowledge: divinatory, common sense and elenchos. We will present as well an explanation about an article called “Individualism and the mental” from Tyler Burge we will present a mental experiment described by him to demonstrate the non  insular formation of concepts and the idea proposed by him about not knowing the complete concept. After that, in the end, we will present an alternative and complementary idea about Brickhouse and Smith theory to resolve the problem.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-12-18
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-Reviewed
Evaluados por los pares
Avaliados pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/661
10.31977/grirfi.v12i2.661
url http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/661
identifier_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v12i2.661
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/661/377
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2015 Homero Damo
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2015 Homero Damo
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2015); 186-195
2178-1036
reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia
instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
instacron:UFRB
instname_str Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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reponame_str Griot : Revista de Filosofia
collection Griot : Revista de Filosofia
repository.name.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||griotrevista@gmail.com
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